In NE II.4, Aristotle claims what virtuous action should look like. Consequently, a puzzle (aporia) is generated. Aristotle provides three features that virtuous activity requires, and two ways of performing just actions to attempt solving this aporia. This paper is divided into five sections: (I) The 3 Necessary Conditions for Virtue; (II) Aristotelean Motivations for Believing Virtuous Activity Possesses these 3 Conditions; (III) How the Aporia is Generated by Aristotle’s Assumptions about Virtue; (IV) Aristotle’s Resolution to the Aporia; and (V) Aristotle’s Account of Ethical Development and its Relationship to the Rational Inquiry into Practical Virtue. Through an investigation of NE, this paper demonstrates …show more content…
In the virtues, however, knowledge is not sufficient. Crafts only require doing right actions, whereas virtues require doing right actions and doing them in right states (1105a27-31). To distinguish crafts from virtues, Aristotle provides three necessary conditions for virtuous action: (1) knowledge—one must know that they are doing the activity; (2) Decision—one must decide on that activity and decide on it in virtue of what that activity is; and (3) Character—one must do that activity from a firm and unchanging state (1105a32-34). In crafts, knowledge functions as bare knowledge—craftsmen know facts about what results from actions. When cocaine addicted plumbers perform right actions—fixing busted pipes and broken toilets—they are rewarded financially. Insofar as they produce right products, their actions are sufficient. However, their actions are means to ends—smoking crack. When busted pipes and broken toilets are fixed, plumbers are praised for right actions—disregarding wrong states. So, craftsmen flourish by performing right actions, regardless of their states of …show more content…
One motivation that Aristotle has for virtuous activities having these conditions is that they tie back to the Function Argument—virtuous activity requires rationality. Aristotle has two ways to be rational—(i) thinking rationally (knowledge and decision), and (ii) shaping our emotions and tendencies to feel pleasures and pains (character). Hence, these conditions for virtue are necessary for Aristotelian agents to flourish. Furthermore, since our decisions promote the end, decisions must involve choosing activities for their own sakes, which require choice-worthiness, self-sufficiency, and completeness—the three conditions for Aristotelean eudaimonia.
(III) How the Aporia in NE II.4 is Generated by Aristotle’s Assumptions about Virtue: The aporia is generated since it seems that we cannot perform just actions unless we are just, and we have to perform just actions to become just (1105a17-21). An orchestra performs Bach, and becomes a better orchestra over time through habituation. But if they cannot play Bach over time, how could they learn to play Bach in the first place? Aristotle thinks there is an intuitive error since (a) one can learn to play Bach by playing it over time, and (b) one who has not practiced enough cannot play Bach. So, how can humans do right actions without being in right states of character?
(IV) Aristotle’s Resolution