One of the provisions of the NCLB allows the Secretary of Education to “waive any statutory of regulatory requirement” with scarcely any exclusions (No Child Left Behind…). The executive administra-tion under President Obama used this provision to relinquish States from some of the more bur-densome requirements of the NCLB (Pozen-Bulman 833). Even though the purpose of this pol-icy shift was a response to frustration at Congress’s failure to amend the NCLB, the effect was a shift of power back to the States pursuant with a doctrine of federalism. It is convenient to trace the effect of this policy back to a fortunate side effect of the administrations frustration with Congress. Conversely, an argument can be formulated that the NCLB was crafted with the un-derstanding of the issues of federalism in the background. Perhaps, this provision was an attempt to embrace the underlying doctrine of federalism by allowing a safeguard against the federal government concentrating power in educational
One of the provisions of the NCLB allows the Secretary of Education to “waive any statutory of regulatory requirement” with scarcely any exclusions (No Child Left Behind…). The executive administra-tion under President Obama used this provision to relinquish States from some of the more bur-densome requirements of the NCLB (Pozen-Bulman 833). Even though the purpose of this pol-icy shift was a response to frustration at Congress’s failure to amend the NCLB, the effect was a shift of power back to the States pursuant with a doctrine of federalism. It is convenient to trace the effect of this policy back to a fortunate side effect of the administrations frustration with Congress. Conversely, an argument can be formulated that the NCLB was crafted with the un-derstanding of the issues of federalism in the background. Perhaps, this provision was an attempt to embrace the underlying doctrine of federalism by allowing a safeguard against the federal government concentrating power in educational