A manufacturer is liable if the incorrect use of the product was reasonably foreseeable, by an ordinary person, and no steps were taken to prevent such use. When material alteration of the product is already known, and strict liability needs to be determined on the part of the seller or manufacturer, the question is whether it is foreseeable that such an alteration would be made. This foreseeable alteration, however, cannot unforeseeably result in an unsafe product, instead, the question is whether the alteration is the superseding cause of harm. The jury is often tasked with determining whether the manufacturer would have known that such an alteration would be made. Ind. Ann. Code § 34-20-2-1 (West 2015). In Schooley v. …show more content…
Ind. Ann. Code § 34-20-2-2 (West 2015). In section 34-20-4-2, a product is labelled defective if a seller fails to provide reasonable warnings about the dangers associated with the product, or fails to provide instructions on the proper use of the product. These two criteria apply if the seller fails to provide them when the seller could have reasonably done so. Ind. Ann. Code § 34-20-4-2 (West 2015). In the case of Stark v. Ford Motor Co., the Plaintiff might use this theory to describe their use of the seatbelt in the Taurus. Ford likely would have known that its consumers might use the seatbelt in that manner, and Stark could claim that there were no warnings against it. Stark v. Ford Motor Co., 693 S.E.2d 253 (N.C.App. 2010). In Weigle v. SPX Corp., an action was brought against a support stand manufacturer because they believed that the warnings were inadequate. The mechanics were unsuccessful in their claim due to the fact that sufficient instructions had been provided. Clear instructions concerning the use of pins in the product were provided; including a diagram that a reasonable person would deem clear concerning the harm that could result from misuse. Weigle v. SPX Corp., 729 F. 3d 724 (7th Cir. …show more content…
Infants under age seven are incapable of understanding crime, thus not allowing them to be held responsible for their actions. Ind. Ann. Code § 31-9-2-13 (West 2015). Since the plaintiff’s father is not a “party” to the action, the defendant tries to claim negligence on the plaintiff. A defense to this claim is that since the plaintiff is an infant, she is incapable of negligence. Stark v. Ford Motor Co., 693 S.E.2d 253 (N.C.App. 2010). In Indianapolis St. Ry. Co. v. Bordenchecker, a similar infant negligent conduct case is brought up. An infant, age 2 ½, was injured by remaining an a rail while a rail car failed to stop before hitting him. Judgment was found in favor of the infant (plaintiff) because since he was quite young, he was incapable of acknowledging danger, and the defendant did not give any warning of its approach to the plaintiff. Indianapolis St. Ry. Co. v. Bordenchecker, 33 Ind. App. 138, 70 N.E.