MRAPs became the poster-child for the supposedly dysfunctional DoD acquisitions process when it became clear that lives were needlessly being lost in Iraq. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) were taking a huge toll, and were responsible …show more content…
Several factors made this acquisition “rapid.” The MRAP was an existing technology, developed originally as a mine-clearing vehicle in the 1960’s and had been used by other countries and the United Nations for years. There was no need for a long development cycle, as typically happens for hardware procurements.
Another factor was the different contracting methods used in this large procurement. A sole source contract was issued to one manufacturer who already had an existing production line for MRAPs. At the same time, an RFP (request for purchase) was issued in order to get as many manufacturers as possible involved. Nine of the ten manufacturers who responded to the initial RFP were awarded IDIQ (indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity) contracts for small numbers of MRAPs for testing purposes; and LRIP (low rate, initial production) awards were presented to five of them considered to be low risk, prior to testing. Normally, the acquisition process moves serially, one step after another, while this rapid acquisition took place (partly) in parallel and out of …show more content…
The process was also competitive throughout in that the manufacturers were incentivized for quick delivery of the test vehicles and did not know that there was a possibility that multiple contracts would be awarded. It is unusual for the Pentagon to award a contract to different manufacturers to meet the same requirement, as this makes maintenance and repair more difficult than if there was only one model in use. But this style of “competitive prototyping” ensured cooperation from all the vendors and produced a better product faster. It is now required for rapid acquisitions of this caliber.
The frequent intervention by strategic leadership also made this acquisitions program unique. Congress weighed in frequently during the requirements stage and the Secretary of Defense had to step in several times to emphasize the importance of the MRAP acquisition in order to overcome bureaucratic foot dragging at the