The violence was so appalling that other U.S. troops like helicopter door-gunner, Larry Colburn, who worked as an aerial scout felt they had to land the helicopter between the soldiers and a group of women and children taking refuge in a bunker to save them (Appy 348). Yet due in part to lies perpetuated by the Army, and in part to a reaction of denial by United States citizens, it took a while for the massacre to change people’s minds about the war. Before the massacre, citizens saw the Vietnam war as a mistake made with good intentions, but after many began to see the war as “fundamentally unjust or immoral” (Appy 344). Many think of the My Lai massacre as an isolated incident, or the worst of the worst, but according to some letters found in 2002 signed only by a “concerned sergeant”, most likely a soldier named George Lewis, the estimated the murders clocked in at some 120-150 people each month (Turse 14). The sergeant writes about how those in command “pushed the body count” as a way to measure how well the army was doing, while simultaneously ignoring the low death-to-weapons captured ratio that indicated many of those who were killed were non-combatants (Turse
The violence was so appalling that other U.S. troops like helicopter door-gunner, Larry Colburn, who worked as an aerial scout felt they had to land the helicopter between the soldiers and a group of women and children taking refuge in a bunker to save them (Appy 348). Yet due in part to lies perpetuated by the Army, and in part to a reaction of denial by United States citizens, it took a while for the massacre to change people’s minds about the war. Before the massacre, citizens saw the Vietnam war as a mistake made with good intentions, but after many began to see the war as “fundamentally unjust or immoral” (Appy 344). Many think of the My Lai massacre as an isolated incident, or the worst of the worst, but according to some letters found in 2002 signed only by a “concerned sergeant”, most likely a soldier named George Lewis, the estimated the murders clocked in at some 120-150 people each month (Turse 14). The sergeant writes about how those in command “pushed the body count” as a way to measure how well the army was doing, while simultaneously ignoring the low death-to-weapons captured ratio that indicated many of those who were killed were non-combatants (Turse