Class Handout - Response to Churchland's Arguments

1. My mental states are introspectively known by me as states of my conscious self.

2. My brain states are not introspectively known by me as states of my conscious self. Therefore, by Leibniz' Law (that numerically identical things must have exactly the same properties),

3. My mental states are not identical with my brain states.

3 ways the dualist might think about mental states vs. brain states:
1. Can't describe introspective natures in physical language.
2. Mental states and properties known thrown through introspection are not the same as brain states.
3. Two different ways of knowing something shows the things known are different.

Churchland equivocates between de re and de dicto use of knows and between knowledge of acquaintance vs. propositional knowledge.

1. My mental states are knowable by introspection.

2. My brain states are not knowable by introspection. Therefore, by Leibniz' Law,

3. My mental states are not identical with my brain states.

Argument C advances Argument A making "introspectability" a property of the state itself.