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109 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
- 3rd side (hint)
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Plato
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Rationalism - all knowledge is innate (nature)
use reasoning |
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Aristotle
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Empiricism - experience is source of knowledge
use observation |
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Inductive
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observation --> theory
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Deductive
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theory --> hypothesis
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John Locke
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British Empiricist
mind develops through experience use informal introspection |
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Logical Positivists
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determine rules of science - objective or subjective
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Wundt
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Structuralism
elements of conscious experience trained introspection |
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William James
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Functionalism
mental processes introspection and objective observations |
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Watson
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Behaviorist - science of overt behavior
E.g. Pavlov's dogs (S-->R) |
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Neo-Behaviorists
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intervening variables, infer these variables through overt behavior
S-O-R |
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Tolman
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animals have expectations
create routine, change things up, look for disruption in behavior |
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Tinklepaugh (1928): monkeys and bananas
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monkey with banana under cup, switch to lettuce, see if looks under other cups
-shows animals can have intentions, make associations (cog. processes) |
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Groen & Parkman (1972): how kids add
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vary size of smaller and larger number
-lesson on how to conduct an exp. and infer cog. processes |
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Cognitive
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s-O-r
Observe and then infer |
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Sternberg (1966): Serial or Parallel
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Scanning through STM:
Serial or Parallel (S) Self-Terminating or Exhaustive (E) |
-shows how to conduct exp, make inferences |
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Sperling (1960): span of apprehension (Part 1)
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Whole report procedure (4-5 items)
Partial Report: 76% correct |
Small Capacity? Large Capacity: register all 12 items but decays before processing |
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Iconic Memory: Characteristics
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Pre-attentive, veridical, pre-categorical, large capacity, quick forgetting/decay rate
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Sperling (1960): Partial Response matrices (Part 2)
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Varied delay of signal:
image available until 300ms |
Conclusion: high capacity with quick delay takes time to recode stimuli into an acoustic form |
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Erikson & Collins (1967): superimposed dots
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Random dot patterns:
column A, B superimposed if present A and then B less than 300 ms after, see superimposed image |
evidence of literal store of A (VOH) |
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Averbach & Coriell (1961): mask after visual presentation
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Fixation Field --> Matrix w/ letters --> Blank or Mask
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Evidence of literal store: Mask erases icon (decays after 300ms anyway) visual erases visual |
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Von Wright (1968): matrix with letters and numbers
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Evidence of Pre-Cat store:
Matrix with both letters and numbers tone cues response: either recall row or recall letters/numbers |
76% with row, 30-40% with category |
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Purpose of Sensory Info Stores
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preserves stimulus for further processing
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Eyelids and Eyeblinks
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clean eyes every 330ms
brain signals eye to blink and then inhibits incoming info, brain processes icon and processes while closed |
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Volkman, Riggs, & Moore (1980): light in mouth while saccading
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Eyeblink (Saccade)
light in mouth, see through mouth change intensity (when eye closed, open, blink) |
open and closed: good detection blink: poor detection |
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Microsaccades
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rapid involuntary eye movement
habituation otherwise |
unlike saccades and eye blinks |
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Saccatic supression
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saccades all over sentence, page every 200 ms
don't take in new info during saccade |
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Latour (1962): light detection while saccading
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Light (light) Light
-alt. which light on (right or left) and fixate -detect light intensity while fixating (100%) -then vary intensity while switching (poor detection) |
Implication: process icon from fixation while saccading |
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Loftus, Johnson, & Shimamura (1985): mask after landscape
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Landscape, then either blank or mask
-present 270ms. better recognition with no mask -present 370ms, no difference |
Implication: icon existing gives 100 extra ms to process (over mask) |
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Weiskrantz (1974): Blindsight - two vis. pathways
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-damage to occ. lobe w/ no conscious vision
-several visual pathways |
Eye --> Occiptial (90%) Eye --> Midbrain/Superio Colliculus (10%), reflexive and unconscious |
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Occipto-Temporal Stream
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-identifies "what" objects are
-ventral -conscious |
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Occipito-Parietal Stream
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-identifies "where" in location, or "how" to get there
-dorsal -unconscious |
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Characteristics of Perception
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-selective
-omit, add, and distort features to produce organized rep. -perception is "hard" |
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Inverse Projection Problem
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3D world on a 2D retina
-lose info -make psychology perception 3D reality |
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Ecological Approach
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what's on retina really rich set of subtle cues giving info about reality
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Computational Approach
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assumes info arriving at sense doesn't completely explain, so we need to compute a rep.
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Likelihood/Simplicity Rule:
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E.g. Dime tilted is actually a circle
E.g. Door - rectangle or trapezoid |
Shape |
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Gravity Rule
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Square or Diamond?
Shape rule |
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Constancy Scaling Theory
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Compute perceived size = Ret. Size + Perceived Distance
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rapid and unconscious |
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Factors that affect Perception
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-nature of physical stimulus
-physiological system -knowledge of the world |
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Bottum-Up Processing
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"data driven"
-initiated by data arriving at the sensory store |
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Top-Down Processing
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"conceptually driven"
-conceptual knowledge influences the process or interpretation of lower level perceptual processes |
use both |
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Functions of Visual Perception
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1) Id objects
2) Navigate in the environment |
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Visual Agnosia
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can't id objects from visual input
-see objects but can't give meaning |
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Prosopagnosia
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can't recognize faces
-damage to ventral stream |
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Fusiform Gyrus
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-where brain recognizes faces
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Template Matching Theory
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-mental copy of environmental stimuli
-need exact copy to id |
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Problems w/ Template Matching
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-recognize things never seen
-need infinite # templates |
but, use parallel processing |
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Pre-Processing Operations (Template Matching)
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-clean up stimuli
-normalize size -rotate |
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Prototype Theory
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"Multiple View"
-best match -include pre-processing ops. |
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Viewer-Centered Theories
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Template Matching and Prototype
-multiple reps. in memory -patterns recognized wholistically -view dependent -assume pre-processing |
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Object Centered Theories
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-have one rep. in memory
-composed of features that go together (geons) -break down into component parts and then see relations to each other |
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Feature Analysis Theory
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Selfridge: Demons
Image, Feature, Cognitive, and Decision Demon |
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Hubel & Wiesel
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evidence we break stimulus down into features
-single cell recording |
-cells responsive to lines -each one 10% + or - -if 5%, both fire equally |
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Receptive Field (Hubel & Wiesel)
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area on retina that a neuron is responsive to
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Hypercolumns (Hubel & Wiesel)
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collections of 200+ neurons that all have same receptive field
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-more complex cells more ventral |
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Current Thinking of Pattern Recognition
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use both viewer and objective centered theories
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Simple cat.: OC Fine Disc.: VC |
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Limitations of Pattern Recog. Theories
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bottom-up only
-but we recognize ambiguous stimuli -read faster in context |
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Miller (1962): words with white noise
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Words in random or meaningful order with white noise in background
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Random: hear 50% words Grammatical: hear 100% -bottom-up same, so top-down influences |
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Pollack & Pickett (1963): isolated words vs speech recog
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ID of isolated words in normal speech is poor
-normal convo in normal room (95% id) -isolate words and put in random order (id 50%) |
-importance of TD processing in perception |
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Samuel (1987): crogress
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Phonemic Restoration Effect
-present non-word (crogress) and replace phoneme |
cr[cough]gress (hear literal) pr[cough]gress (hear "progress" with cough in background) -phoneme coming from top-down |
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Davenport & Potter (2004): Football player/priest
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Consistent/Inconsistent scenes (football player and priest)
-id object or background after quick presentation and mask |
Obj: C - 85%; IC - 70% Bgr: C - 50%; IC - 35% |
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Neely (1977): "pear" and prime
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Priming in LDT
-no prime or prime -faster when related prime beforehand |
Explanation: -threshold of activation - no prime all buttom-up -prime - top-down too which sends out activation to all assocations of "pear" which speeds up activation |
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Characteristics of Attentional System
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1) selectively attend
2) some processing of unattended info (ability to switch) |
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Cherry (1953): DLT physical characteristics
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DLT: remember only physical characteristics of unattended message
-present or absent, male or female |
-not language, not meaning, not speech vs. non-speech |
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Moray (1959): LDT - recog on unattended channel
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LDT: chance recog. and minimal memory of words presented in unattended ear
-very little processing -supports Early Selection |
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Attention Theories
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Early Filter/Bottleneck, Late Selection (Filter), and Resource Capacity
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Early Filter (Selection)/Bottleneck
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-attend only one message at a time
-process both for physical analysis only |
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Problems with Early Selection Theory
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-not adaptive (can't switch to important task)
-research shows we do process (somewhat) unattended stimuli |
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Triesman (1960): "at the ballgame...the pitcher threw"
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-shows limitation of Early Selection
-"At the ballgame...word word" -"Word word...the pitcher threw" |
-switch to ear that makes more sense, more consistent |
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Late Selection Theory
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-process both messages for physical and meaning, then select
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-bias to select message consistent with task -bias to select most highly activated signal (important/expected) |
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Problems with Late Selection
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-assumes memory for meaning of unattended
-perhaps it's in unconscious (implicit memory) |
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Eich (1984): homophones in unattended (DLT)
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-shadow, present 16 homophones in unattended
- (some have bias word: "window" pane) |
-bad explicit memory for them -if had bias word, more likely to write down homophone they saw (implicit) -suggests late selection (implicit mem for unattended channel) |
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Marcell (1980): Priming LDT - top down processes
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-xxx--> wrist (slow)
-palm --> wrist (fast) -palm (mask) --> wrist (still fast) |
-aid of top-down processes (even with mask) |
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Resource Capacity Theories
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Kahneman, 1973
-finite pool of attentional resources, allocate pool |
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Johnson & Heinz (1974): DLT same message
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DLT: with same message repeated
-light intensity changes |
-Early trials: slow in detection (shadow takes up resources) -Late trials: faster (shadowing takes up less, know better - more automatic) |
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Green & Bevelier (2003): Flanker Compatibility Task
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-see square, then compatible (circles with a square, and square distractor)
-incompatible, see square, circles with squares but triangle distractor |
Low Load: Late Selection theory High Load: Early Selection theory |
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Kahneman (bus driver study)
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DLT: switch from attended to unattended when light changes intensity
-ability to selectively attend predicts accident records |
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Characteristics of Auto Processing Theory
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1) require few resources
2) extensive training 3) rarely conscious 4) occurs w/o intention (Stroop) |
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James Reason/Action Slips
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unintended, often automatic actions inappropriate for current situation
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Flanker Effect experiment
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-only supposed to read bottom word (top word a flanker)
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-non-word (510ms); unrelated word (510ms) -related word (480ms) -we automatically read flanker, unintended (obligatory access) |
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Spelke, Hirst, & Neisser (1980): comprehension and dictation
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-read stories aloud for comprehension
-or, read aloud and dictate other words |
-better comp. for condition 1 -however, after a ton of practice, dictation condition equals condition 1 -automaticity from practice |
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Inattentional Blindness
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failure to consciously perceive clearly visible objects (in center of visual field)
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Implications of Inattentional Blindness
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-Late Selection theory: still processing, just unconsciously
-intuition: unconscious processing |
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Beilock, Carr, et. al (2002)
-Attention and Automatic Performance Experiment One |
-experienced golfers putting from different spots
-C1: divided attention --> hear "thorn" and say aloud -C2: focused attention --> focus on swing, say "stop" at end of swing |
Results: better putting in C1 (divided attention) |
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Beilock, Carr, et. al (2002)
-Attention and Automatic Performance Experiment Two |
-novice and experienced soccer players dribbling around cones
-C1: divided attention ("thorn") -C2: focused: hear tone and report if last touched ball with inside or outside |
Results: -Novice (r): better in focused attention -Experienced (r): better in divided -Experienced (l): better in focused -Implication: when learning - pay attention; when automatic - divide attention |
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Binding Problem
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in parallel distributed processing, simultaneously process all aspects of (ex. red ball rolling)
-how are all these features bound as a unified perception? |
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Feature Integration Theory (Triesman)
-Bind Problem |
1) when processing, do pre-attentive processing (parallel feature analysis) - free floating, not attached
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2) in parietal lobe, focused attention does binding |
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Cohen & Terry (1989)
Binding Problem |
-two numbers, report bigger font
-meanwhile, an F (or X) and a distractor (O) digit appear in periphery in either red or greeen -report whether X or F presented -report in what color |
Results: -can report on letter, but had to guess what color -had encoded letter, but not color to letter (still pre-attentive) |
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Robertson & Triesman (1987)
Case Study: Bind Problem |
-patient who can't focus attention
-show either blue square or green circle |
-can report if square or circle, and can report if blue or green, but can't attach red to square nor green to circle -as if free-floating |
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Limits to Performing two tasks Simultaneously: Pashler vs. capacity theory
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-Pashler
-against capacity theory, which says that limits correspond to task demands and individual response capacity |
Pashler: -thinks more severe limits: can't perform two decisions at same time -bottleneck |
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Pashler (1992)
Limits to Simultaneous Decisions Exp. 1 |
-Simple Tasks
-present "1" and press red key; see "2" press green key (left hand) -Task 2: "A" = left key; "B" = right key (all with right hand) |
Task 1: Perceive S1 / Response Selection / Execute Response 1 -wait 150ms -Task 2: ---- Perceive S2 / Response Selection / Execute Response 2 (Capacity) -Task 2: ---- Perceive S2 / .... Response Selection / Execute Response 2 (Pashler) |
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Pashler (1992)
Limits to Simultaneous Decisions Exp. 2 |
T1 more difficult: Capacity
-Task 1: P -- S1 / RS / Ex R1 -Task 2: -- P S2 / RS / Ex R2 -takes same time |
Pashler -Task 1: P -- S1 / RS / Ex R1 -Task 2: -- P S2 / ---- / RS / Ex R2 -takes more time than Cap. Theory |
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Pashler (1992)
Limits to Simultaneous Decisions Exp. 3 |
T2 more difficult: Capacity
-Task 1: P S1 / RS / Ex R1 -Task 2: -- P --- S1 / RS / Ex R2 |
Pashler: -Task 1: P S1 / RS / Ex R1 -Task 2: -- P --- S1 / RS / Ex R2 -takes as much time as Cap. Theory |
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Yerkes-Dodson Law (1908)
Arousal and Performance Simple |
Curvilinear:
-Low arousal = low performance -Med arousal = high performance -High arousal = low performance |
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Berkun (1964): unethical arousal study with army parachute
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-Phase 1: recruits learn ditching procedure and lists personal belongings
-Phase 2: -Exp: on plane, think going to crash, told to remember D procedure and belongings -Control: not going to die, but list D and belongings |
-Exp. 30% worse recall on D procedure and 10% worse on belongings -high arousal decreases performance |
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de Quervian (2000)
-Cortizone and Arousal/Performance |
Group 1: different levels of cortizone (cortisol/stress)
Group 2: control |
-med. level of cortizone better performance than control -high and low levels worse performance than control |
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Cue Utilization Hypothesis (Easterbrook, 1959)
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1) Arousal takes up attentional capacity
2) Arousal reduces # cues used to direct performance |
Ex. number pattern -Low: won't restrict range, think of either possible pattern -High: restrict range, only think of limited cue -Med: proper range of cues |
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How to overcome high arousal/low performance
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-lower arousal
-overlearn response (so that more capacity available for arousal) |
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Yerkes-Dodson (1908) Law
-Real law -Easy task |
-Low: low performance
-Med: low performance -High: high performance |
arouse a lot, want restricted range |
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Yerkes-Dodson (1908) Law
-Real law -Med task |
-Normal Y-D curve
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Yerkes-Dodson (1908) Law
-Real law -Complex task |
-Low: high performance
-Med: low performance -High: low performance |
need many cues, so don't arouse much |
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Thought Suppression
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unwanted thoughts often interfere with attention
-Ex. quitting a bad habit, always think about it |
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Wegner et. al (1987)
Thought Suppression |
Report stream of consciousness
-Group 1: Expression (can think of white bear, ring bell) then Suppression (don't think of bear, but ring bell) -Group 2: Suppression then Expression |
Results: -G1: Expression (response decreases; Suppression (response decreases) -G2: Suppression (response decreases); Expression (response increases |
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Thought Suppression Theory
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when suppressing, do "controlled distractor search"
-this is conscious and takes up resources -soon, all distractors associated with forbidden thought |
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Limits to Wegner's Thought Suppression experiment
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-demand characteristics
-introspection used |
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Ventral (vs. Dorsal)
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e.g. towards feet
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Dorsal (vs. Ventral)
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e.g. towards head
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Shiffrin & Schneider (1997)
Auto=Reduced attn. setup |
Memory set, search cards to see if they have letter (distractors)
Cat. Condition: one pool for mem set, different one for distractor Mixed condition: one big pool for them all |
if visual search auto, take same amount of time to process cards no matter how many stimuli |
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Shiffrin & Schneider (1997)
Auto=Reduced attn. results |
became auto in C Condition only
shows that through practice, it becomes auto need consistency |
theories: better memory, or losing middle processes, or a secondary process takes over |