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83 Cards in this Set
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Definitions: PM vs RM
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PM: remembering to perform an action in the future
RM: memory for past events |
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why PM an interesting topic
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1) Important for everyday life (more failures, embarrassing)
2) Failures can have serious consequences (1/2 Americans take med) 3) Little research despite importance and prev. |
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Typical PM Paradigm
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1) Engage in ongoing task (e.g. LDT)
2) In addition, PM task (e.g. press Q when see "rake") |
3) Delay: other activities (e.g. vocab test) 4) Reintroduce ongoing task, don't mention PM task (PM measure: how often still press Q) |
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Diffs in PM and RM: recall
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for RM, it is cued recall - given "train" and requested to search memory
for PM, given "Katherine" but no request to search mem |
to remember PM, must see Katherine as a cue, not just a friend |
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PM Theories: Monitoring (Smith)
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1) capacity consuming process (in part)
2) monitoring necessary for PM retrieval |
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Smith (2003): Evidence for monitoring
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ongoing task, vary if have PM task or not
if have PM, LDT responses slowed down than if no PM task |
suggests monitoring, less capacity for LDT, slower time those with slower times had better PM performance but, gave Ps 6 cues, which necessitates monitoring |
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PM Theories: Multiprocess (Einstein & McDaniel)
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1) remembering to perform action in future is critical
2) adaptive to have flexible system that uses a variety of mechanisms |
3) In addition to monitoring, there are SR proceses |
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Spontaneous Retrieval (PM)
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-occurrence of a cue that has been associated with an intention can cause an intention to pop into mind even when not monitoring
-retrieval occurs in response to a target mem |
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Reflexive Associate Theory (PM)
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1) During planning, people form an assoc between target and intended action
2) later, when target cue encountered, an assoc system (hippocampal) delivers intended action to consciousness (KEY is making assoc) |
3) occurs rapidly, obligatorily, and with few cog. resources |
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Scullin et al (2010): discourage monitoring - Part 1
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Discouraged monitoring by having 1 target item, emphasized importance of ongoing task and de-emphasized PM task, delayed onset of one target event for a long time (500 trials after instructions)
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response times equal in both groups (whether PM task or no) -Monitor prediction: low performance; MP prediction: good performance (good: .73) |
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Scullin et al (2010): discourage monitoring - Part 2
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Key variable: focal (SR) and non-focal (monitor)
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w/ non-focal cues, had low performance (.18) Monitoring and MP would both predict this |
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Focal processing:
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when ongoing task encourages processing of the target and especially those features processed at encoding
-SR likely (e.g. press Q when see rake) |
both rake and LDT meaningful task - uses same processes |
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Non-focal Processing:
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ongoing task doesn't encourage processing of target at encoding
-Monitoring likely (SR unlikely) (e.g. press Q when see word that begins with "r") |
"r" not meaningful, but LDT is - different processes |
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Einstein et al (2005): PM task suspension
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give image rating task with PM intention (press Q when see rake)
then, suspend PM task for later (should be no monitoring then) - do LDT task purely for speed, yet still present old PM target 5 times |
if SR: slower response when see suspended rake (thought pops into mind, must supress) if no SR: same speed Results: Ps slow down; older adults still press Q (less inhibition) |
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Aging and PM effects (in general)
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mixed findings (some show effects, some don't)
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Craik's theory: auto processes don't slow with age, but non-auto do -SR auto, monitoring non-auto, so monitoring slows Non-focal shows effects, Focal does not |
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Mullet et al (in press): Age diffs for Focal and Non-focal
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3 blocks of LDT (Control - no PM, Focal - see printer, Nonfocal - see c word)
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LDT response: no slowing for focal, but slowing for non-focal (evidence of monitoring) Performance: age declines for non-focal, no diffs for focal (even for oldest adults) -explains mixed findings: maybe SR processes are preserved in older adults |
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Implementation Intentions: Gollwitzer (1999)
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1) although people form strong intentions, they are often general (e.g. take BP later)
2) people must form II, more specific (e.g. when x happens, I'll do y - take BP at breakfast) |
3) II allows one to switch from conscious control (monitoring) to automatic control (SR) -at breakfast tomorrow, BP med will spontaneously pop into mind |
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Imp Intention Study: breast examination
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teach women to examine breasts daily (by video); either make general or imp. intention (where and when will examine vs. will examine)
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women with sp. intention were more successful, had more checks |
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Implication of Imp Intention: leaving child in car
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in half of deaths, parent forgets child - cause of irresponsible parenting or PM failure?
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vulnerability to forgetting in absence of good cues (see case of Mark Warschauer) |
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Explicit Memory definition
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Declarative - memories that can be consciously recalled
includes episodic and semantic mem |
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Episodic Mem def.
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1) mems about episodes ("I remember")
2) associated with a particular time and place (I had a hamburger for dinner) 3) autobiographic (personal past); only happened once |
remember when actually happened, when learned, etc vary from person to person |
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Semantic Mem def
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1) general world knowledge ("I know")
e.g. vocabularly |
don't remember when learned, just know in general same as with others |
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Episodic and Sem mem as Interdependent
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use sem mems to create ep mems (e.g. have conversation at Starbucks, but remember later)
at one time, sem mems were ep mems (when you learn something) |
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Tulving (1989): KC case study
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motorcycle accident, all he remembers are SM, not Ep Mems (e.g. know has car, can't remember driving it)
also can't think about future |
-suggests Sm and Ep Mem mediated by diff brain systems -ep mem important for both past and future |
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Tulving: Brain imaging data on Sm and Ep mem
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think about episode vs think about planet's orbit
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Ep: more activity in right hemi Sem: more activity in left hemi Tulving: only humans have Ep Mem, only humans can plan for future |
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Explicit Memory vs. Imp Mem
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EM: conscious and deliberative use of mem (e.g. free recall, recog)
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IM: tasks do not require conscious recollection - tests for prior exposure |
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Repetition priming
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change in speed and accuracy and bias in test phase processing of an item due to study phase experience with item
-effect in IM |
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Types of IM tests
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1) Perceptual ID - present items quickly (35 ms); detect old items better than new items
2) Word Fragment Completion - _ef_; _ab_e - know more old fragments 3) LDT - faster responses to old words |
Old item - new item |
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Dissociation definition
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-find that variables have an effect on one component of the cog system but no effect on another component
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-sp. finding a diff effect on EM and IM -suggests that diff brain structures control diff functions (e.g. Goldman-Rakic monkey study) - double dissociation |
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Jacboy & Dallas (1981): Levels of processing in IM and EM
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-do either deep (pleasantness) or shallow (rhyme) task
-be tested either with EM test (recog) or IM test (Perc. ID) |
-No diff between deep and shallow task in IM test condition -dissociation: deep processing only improves EM but not IM |
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Mitchell & Road (1988): Amnesia and IM/EM
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-give 96 pics, name image (dog, apple)
-1/2 items test by recog (EM), 1/2 by pic naming test (speed of response - IM, old and new pics) |
Normal people better performance on EM than amnesiacs, but equal performance on IM test Dissociation: amnesia affects EM, not IM |
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Benzodiazepines study: IM/EM
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-give placebo or drug, learn list of words
-delay, let effects of drug (or placebo) wear off -give either IM or EM test |
Dissociation: no effect or drug on IM but effect on EM |
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Aging and IM/EM
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aging only effects EM, not IM
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Subliminal Presentation
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perception w/o awareness, but behavior affected
-1956 - Drink Coca-Cola movie theater (sales went up) |
can behavior be controlled w/o our knowledge? tested by EM tests, see no effect |
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Kunst-Wilson & Zajanc (1980): Subliminal effects from IM tests
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present at fast speeds 20 irregular octagons (10 ms)
-1/2 items tested by recog; 1/2 items tested by preference test |
Recog: chance Pref: liked old items better than new, greater than chance) |
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Perfect & Askew (1994): Incidental exposure to advertisements
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show incidental ads, test with IM or EM tests
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no effects of EM, but slightly IM effects (more pref. to incidental ads) |
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IM/EM Explanations: Memory Systems View (Tulving) - general
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-Different mem systems responsible for processing IM and EM
-supports parallel dist. processing |
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IM/EM Explanations: Memory Systems View (Tulving) - EM
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conscious and meaningful analysis of events, keeps record of that processing (e.g studying)
in hippocampal / medial temporal lobes |
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IM/EM Explanations: Memory Systems View (Tulving) - IM
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automatic and unconscious perceptual analysis (e.g. pattern recog) and keeps record of it
in occipital - temporal stream / temporal auditory cortex |
-also increases neural efficiency of that process (next time you read dog, you'll do so more quickly and efficiently) |
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Gabrielli et al (1995): MS
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-Normal, dense amnesiacs, and MS (epileptic, no right occ. lobe) as participants
-read 24 items (conscious process) - 1/2 recog, 1/2 Perc ID (16.7 ms) |
Norms: good on IM and EM DA: good on IM, bad on EM MS: good on EM, bad on IM - MS has no priming; right occ lobe holds some IM processing |
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IM/EM Explanation: Conscious and Unconscious Processing (Jacoby) - general
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-Automatic Ret - unconscious: prior exposure leads to more fluent processing (faster, easier)
-feeling of familiarity -just need prior exposure |
Controlled Ret. - Conscious: invoked by the intent to remember -need full attn, good processing, etc |
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Jacoby: process pure
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an EM test not entirely controlled ret. (some IM too)
e.g. see dog - circle dog (don't remember it but know it) |
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Mandler: Butcher on the Bus
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see face on bus, say I know him, figure out it's the butcher
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Ways Conscious and Unconscious processes work together to affect behavior (Jacoby)
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1) Automatic ret. stimulates a conscious ret. search (e.g. Butcher on bus)
-aging and divided attn affect controlled ret. |
2) Conscious ret. processes oppose auto ret. process -telling same story twice: b/c feels familiar but control search fails (don't remember telling it) |
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Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley (1989): Non-famous names - Part 1
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-read 40 non-famous names; either with full attn. or divided attn (1 digit every 2 seconds, press key if hear 3 consecutive odd digits)
-told all Ps names not famous -give fame rating task (old non-famous, new non-famous, famous) - interested if rate old non-famous as famous b/c fimiliar |
DA: have familiar feeling but can't consciously recall b/c attn. divided (27% false rating) FA: better conscious ret. search (19% false rating) |
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Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley (1989): Non-famous names - Part 2
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give recog test (10 old NF not presented during test phase, and 10 new non-famous)
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FA: 63% hits, 0% false alarms DA: 30% hits, 11% false alarms (poorer controlled search) |
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Deja vu and Familiar Feeling
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Thought: there before but attn divided; so once there again, familiar feeling but can't remember actual context
Actual: false though - old adults have less deja vu |
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Perception/Memory as a Video Recorder
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False - only veridical for 300 ms, then a construction of a representation
-use bottom up and top down, add and omit |
Retrieval: don't just dump out mems, you reconstruct them (top down) -post-event info also affects mems |
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The importance of Comprehension of memory
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relating what you're learning to what you already know (but we supply info not in original message)
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Logical Inferences
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we add these necessarily true inferences at comprehension
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Ex. Sentence - The 3 turtles on a floating log, fish swam beneath it Delay: then " " them. - say same; or " near log"... - say no (remember meaning) |
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Pragmatic Inferences
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we add reasonable but not necessarily true inferences
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Ex. sentence: karate guy hit the brick day later, we say broke the brick, or hit the brick with his hand |
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Bagget (1975): Barber shop pics (pragmatic inf)
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-give series of pics (long-haired dude goes into barbershop, comes out with short hair)
-either immediate test (pic of actually getting hair cut) or test 1 week later (same false pic) |
-imm. test - say no; delay test - say yes example of prag inf - blends stimulus and inference |
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Events prior knowledge influences at retrieval?
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Typical events, NOT atypical ones
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Bartlett (1932): First Schema study (canoe)
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-read Native American folk story to English boys; many elements foreign to them
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-recall influenced by schemas (added, omitted changed details to fit schema) -e.g. change "canoe" to "boat" |
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Reconstruction (Bartlett)
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in retrieval we use info from both memory storehouse and from knowledge of world (schema) to reconstruct what probably happened
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NOT just pulling info from mem storehouse |
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Bower, Black & Turner (1979): Script study
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-script of restaurant scene, does not mention about patron paying bill
-recog test about confidence in seeing sentences in story |
-high confidence in script sentences actually in story, but also in script sentences NOT in story (5.46-3.49) -low confidence in sentences neither in script nor story |
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Dooling & Christiaansen (1977): Helen Keller study
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-read story about "Carol Harris" (Helen Keller's real name)
-1 wk delay - was sentence "She was deaf, dumb, blind" in story? -some right before recog test told that Carol was Helen Keller's real name or not told anything |
-those not told don't believe sentence in story, those told do (falsely recognize sentence to be in story) -shows reconstruction at ret., b/c told after encoding happened, right at ret. |
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Roediger & McDermott (1995); Deese (1959): "Sleep" false mem study
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read list of words that all have to do with concept of sleep (but "sleep" not on it)
-either immediate or delay recall |
-immediate: recall "sleep" on as often as words that were actually on it -high confidence, even when told they will be tempted to recall associates not on list -with 2 day delay, report "sleep" even more often than actual list word (McDermott, 1996) |
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Why does "sleep" false memory recall occur (from Roediger & McDermott, 1995, study)
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1) Background knowledge (that "sleep" is related to other list words) becomes folded into mem for list w/o participant intended it to
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2) Or, hear list of sleep-related words and then think about "sleep" at encoding; at recall, can't remember if just thought about it or actually perceived it (source mem error) |
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Source Memory & Source Confusion
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-remember the source from which information originated
-mistaking one's own thought for an event (did I shut the garage door or just think i did) |
like reality monitoring |
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Gonsalves et al (2004): Reality Monitoring - from Exam 2
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show 350 words; 1/2 followed by pic of word, 1/2 by black rectangle (mental image word)
-test: see word or imagine it? |
-27% of time thought saw pic when really image -more activity in visual imagery of brain, more likely false mem |
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Loftus, Miller, & Burns (1978): Crash scene photos
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-show slide show of crash scene
-fill out questionnaire regarding scene -some questions misleading (did car pass other car when stop at yield sign - when really it was a stop sign) |
-later, when selecting which sign they saw (stop or yield), those who were misled had false mem twice as often as those not misled -prob source confusion - remember seeing about yield sign, but forgot saw it in question, not actual pic |
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Loftus & Palmer (1974): "Smash" "Hit" study
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-short film of crash scene, estimate speed at which cars were going when collided
-alternate verb: "hit" / "smash" / "bumped" etc |
-estimated higher speeds when more violent verb used -also asked if saw any broken glass (1 wk later) - more likely to say yes if violent verb used |
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Effect of providing misleading info on false mems
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1) Stronger with longer delay
2) Works better with peripheral events rather than central |
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Bruck & Ceci (2004): READING - Forensic Development Truths about Misconceptions
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1) Children do delay in divulging abuse, but will tell all (not in denial); can answer open-ended questions fine
2) Suggestiveness of interview indexed by interviewer bias (not leading question - it's the bias of Q and response to the A) |
3) Suggestibility affects older children too, even adults 4) All it takes is one suggestible interview to taint a response |
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Kassin & Kiechel (1996): READING - false confessions ALT key
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-experimenters read list of letters, Ps typ on computer
-some have confederate, some don't (some lie, some don't) -either experimenters read fast or slow -pressing ALT key ruins program |
-esp. if witness present and lies, P will sign, internalize and confabulate -also heightened in fast condition |
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Lindsay et al (2004): READING - Photos and False mems
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-two real events, one false (1-2 grade); either have class pics from that year or not
-hear events, respond if can remember/image -during week, think about the false mem |
lots of false mems, but more in photo condition |
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Dywan & Jacoby (1990): READING - false fame and source monitoring
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-judge if famous or not (20 and 20)
-pronounce nonfamous (40) -test if famous or not (40 new famous; 20 old non-famous, 20 new NF) -recog test (10 old non-famous read in Phase 2 but not tested in Phase 3) |
-old adults more likely to make familiarity error (false fame), even though recog names less -must be due to source monitoring - name is familiar, but can't remember if b/c famous or b/c seen before |
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Jacoby (1983): from Riesberg - No context, context, generate
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-No context (XXXX, Dark), Context (Hot, Cold), or Generate (Low, ???) conditions
-normal effects on EM test, but also given IM test (tachistoscopic) |
-reverse effects - best performance on NC, then C, then G -due to perceptual contact - really have to perceive in NC, don't perceive at all in G, kind of perceive in C |
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Begg, Anas, & Farinacci (1992): from Riesberg - Henry Ford forgets reverse gear
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Hear sentence, rate how interesting (some true, some false; some told if true before [man's voice vs women's voice])
-rate credibility when presented later |
-if heard before, more likely to be true (even if earlier told would be false) -familiarity leads to greater credibility ("illusion of truth") |
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Jacoby, Allan, Collins, & Larwill (1988): from Riesberg - Noise level and IM
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-presented with some sentences
-burst of noise, judge how loud (within each burst is a sentence) |
-naturally, they easier hear old sentences (even in burst of noise) -but, they rate those bursts of noise (with sentences they could ID) as quieter, b/c reason if I can hear sentence must be quieter |
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Brown, Deffenbacher, & Sturgill (1977): from Riesberg - Mug Shot
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-witness staged crime; 3 day delay, see mug shots of people alleged to be in crime (weren't though)
-4 more day delay, asked to ID guilty person from lineup |
-29% falsely ID guilty person as person from mug shot (not in actual crime scene) -source confusion - recognized person but thought familiarity due to being in crime |
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Familiarity (Riesenberg's textbook)
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1) Encountered stimulus before
2) Due to prior exposure, now more fluent in processing 3) Detect that fluency is greater than expected |
4) Decided that fluent b/c encountered before 5) Draw conclusion about when or where you encountered that stimuli |
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Familiarity in essence (Riesenberg's text)
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a conclusion you draw, based on a feeling (of specialness) that is triggered by the stimulus
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IMs are specific (Riesenberg's text)
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Perceptual - skill will only emerge if you encounter that exact stimulus
Conceptual - combination of ideas, so altering stimulus won't matter |
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Modality Transfer study: from Risenberg's text
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-either see list of words, then do LDT; or hear list of words and do LDT
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-changing modality (hear to see) reduces priming effect |
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Usefulness of inferences
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requires less detail, makes communication more efficient
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Misinformation effect (Loftus)
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memory for an event can be altered by info after event
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How to implant a memory (Loftus)
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1) Introduce delay between event and misinformation
2) Slip in misinformation 3) Delay before final test |
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Discrepancy Detection Principle (Loftus)
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misinformation effect more likely when people don't detect discrepancy between original event and misinformation
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How misinformation works (Loftus)
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1) Hear event, have memory
2) Hear question, have memory for question 3) After delay, becomes a blended memory, lose source of information (source confusion) |
Memories are malleable |
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Childhood sexual abuse: Possibility 2
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1) No abuse
2) Therapist believes: memories faithful, sexual abuse rampant, and wide ranging sx |
3) Misinformation implanted by therapist 4) Person eventually confuses actual mem with false mem |
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Loftus (1995; 1996): 3 true, 1 false mem
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-3 true events, 1 false event (lost at shopping mall when younger - emotional)
-think about false event for one month |
-by last interview, 25% falsely remembered event -many even came up with vividly detailed account |