Negligence: Proximate Cause

1. P needs to prove that the D is the proximate cause of the injury, the close and easily identifiable reason the injury occurred. (Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Daniels)

2. The entire cause and effect chain does not need to be analyzed; would soon prove very unsatisfactory; ridiculous cause and effect relationships would be asserted.

3. D is only liable for the ordinary and natural results of his conduct and not remote damages that are caused by his negligence. (Ryan v. New York Central R.R. Co.)

4. Other outside factors beyond D’s control may influence the creation of remote damages.

1. D must take P as he finds him and may be held liable in damages for aggravation of a preexisting illness. (Bartolone v. Jeckovich)

2. D will only be held responsible for damage as long as it is directly traceable to the negligent act and not due to the operation of independent causes having no connection with the negligent act, EVEN IF the exact kind of damage is not of the nature that one would expect. (In re Arbitration Polemis and Furness)

1. Issue: Whether duty is a relative concept owed to particular foreseeable persons, or whether duty is owed to everyone.

2. Majority: Duty is relative, only to foreseeable impact.

a. Cardozo: When harm to the P is not foreseeable by the reasonable man in the D's position, no duty, but this DOES NOT mean the opposite, that when a victim is foreseeable, the D automatically has a duty.

3. Dissent: says duty not relative, it is universal.

a. If view had been accepted does not mean duty would have always existed to everyone. Still the substantive requirement that there needs to be a foreseeable risk of physical harm to somebody to require reasonable care. However, if D is in the presence of that foreseeable risk, the duty is then extended to all and applies to anyone who IS injured.

1. Direct Consequences

2. Foreseeability

1. Composed of In Re Polemis, Andrews dissent in Palsgraf and Alston

2. D is liable for unforeseen “types” of consequences, when the harm or injury is directly traceable to the D's actions and there are no intervening causes. (Polemis)

3. Typically follow that type of injury DOES NOT have to be foreseeable as long as it is directly traceable to D's actions.

4. Falls out of directly traceable rule if injury is so remote, unexpected, or too far away in time from original negligence to be affected.

5. Also take into account intervening causes.

1. Wagon Mound 1 Principle: The “kind” of injury caused must be a reasonably foreseeable result of the D's negligence.

2. When P has suffered a kind of damage, for liability, “that kind” of injury must be foreseeable.

3. Wagon Mound 2 Principle: Although a risk may be extremely unlikely, if it is still foreseeable, then the D is liable.

4. P may argue that an injury is a “type” of the “kind” of injury that was foreseeable).

5. Chain of liability is not severed when intervening act is a normal consequence of the situation created by defendant. (Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp.)

6. Proximate cause must be limited to those causes which are so closely connected with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in imposing liability. (Yun v. Ford Motor Co.)

7. When a foreseeable injury, proven to be caused by the D's negligence, DEVELOPS into something unforeseeable, D is also liable for unforeseeable consequences.

8. Measured though with the force of intervening and superseding causes.