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Kremen v. Cohen Network Solution, Inc.
Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff Kremen sued Defendant Network Solution, Inc. for conversion to recover losses related to Defendant’s improperly reassigning Plaintiff’s domain name “sex.com” to another person.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. To establish the tort of conversion, a plaintiff must show (1) ownership or right to possession of property, (2) wrongful disposition of the property right, and (3) damages. To determine whether a “property right” exists in satisfaction of element (1) of conversion, there must be (1) an interest capable of precise definition, (2) it must be capable of exclusive control, and (3) the putative owner must have established a legitimate claim to exclusivity.
Moore v. Regents of the University of California
(1990)
Moore v. Regents of the University of California was a landmark Supreme Court of California decision filed on July 9, 1990 which dealt with the issue of property rights in one's own body parts. John Moore underwent treatment for hairy cell leukemia at the UCLA Medical Center under the supervision of Dr. David W. Golde. Moore's cancer was later developed into a cell line that was commercialized. The California Supreme Court ruled that Moore had no right to any share of the profits realized from the commercialization of anything developed from his discarded body parts.

Justices had to decide if this was a question of CONVERSION of property
Plaintiff stated a cause of action in lack of informed consent and breach of fiduciary duty, but not in CONVERSION
JONES V ALFRED H MAYER CO
(1968)
Brief Fact Summary. Petitioner Jones (Petitioner) attempted to buy a home in St. Louis County, Missouri. The Respondent Alfred H. Mayer Co. (Respondent) refused to sell the home to the Petitioner. The Petitioner brought legal action against the Respondent, arguing Respondent had refused to sell the home to him solely because he was black.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. 42 U.S.C. Section:1982 (Section:1982), an Act of Congress, states all citizens shall have the same property rights as white citizens. The Act bars both public racial discrimination as well as private racial discrimination in the sale or rental of property. As such, Section:1982 was a valid exercise of Congressional power enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment.
The Court held that Congress could regulate the sale of private property in order to prevent racial discrimination.
STATE V SHACK
(1971)
Brief Fact Summary. Defendants entered upon private property in order to aid migrant workers housed thereupon, and, after being ordered to leave by the owner, refused and were convicted of trespassing.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Under New Jersey state property law there is no right to bar access to government services available to migrant workers; therefore, no trespass occurred.
Facts. Tedesco (property owner), a farmer, housed migrant workers on his property. Co-Defendant Shack (Shack) was employed by a legal aid organization funded pursuant to an act of Congress which was designed to aid migrant farm workers. Co-Defendant Tejeras (Tejeras)contacted Co-Defendant Shack after having a dispute with property owner over access to a migrant worker who needed medical attention. Shack wanted to speak with another migrant housed at the farm regarding a legal matter. Both Shack and Tejeras then entered upon the property to see the migrants. Property owner Tedesco then stopped both Defendants and, after hearing of their intentions, offered to go and get both of the migrants. Property owner also stated that he would have to be present when Co-Defendant Shack met with the migrant regarding the legal matter. Co-Defendants declined such an arrangement stating that they would go to the living quarters of the men they sought and speak privately. Property owner summoned a st
ate trooper and then executed a written complaint of trespass. Co-Defendants were prosecuted in Municipal and County Court by counsel for property owner and were convicted in Municipal Court and again in County Court by trial de novo. Thereafter, appeal was taken to the Appellate Division, but, prior to argument, the Supreme Court of New Jersey certified the appeal.

Issue. Should the property owner be allowed to refuse access to migrant workers housed upon his property and to prosecute aid workers for trespass?

Held. No. Remanded to County Court with directions to enter judgment of acquittal on each Defendant.
Neither the First Amendment nor the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution is implicated in this case. As to the First Amendment, the Court considered a case regarding workers living in a “company owned” town where the company attempted to prosecute Jehovahs’ Witnesses for trespass. [Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)]. The entire town was owned by a private corporation and was otherwise indistinguishable from other towns. In such a case the rule barring trespass conviction rests on the fact that the entire town is opened to the general public. As to the Supremacy Clause, the Defendants argued that the application of the state trespass statute would defeat the purpose of the federal act which empowered Co-Defendant Shack to render legal aid to migrants. The Court reasoned that no definitive holding could be found to support either Constitutional argument, and further that under New Jersey state law there is no property right which includes the right to bar access of migrant workers
to governmental services. Therefore, no trespass occurred.
The Court found that “Title to real property cannot include dominion over the destiny of persons the owner permits to come upon the premises.” In other words, the right of property is not an absolute right. Citing historical precedents the Court found that property may not be used to injure others and that necessity has historically been an acceptable reason to enter the private lands of another. This is a public policy holding.
There is no need to consider whether the migrants are tenants of the property owner. The Court found that to use such reasoning would be contrived and would not benefit the class of migrant workers the Court was endeavoring to protect with its judgment.
The Court attempted to strike a balance between the rights of the migrants and those of the property owner. This holding is not to be considered as opening the farm to the general public. Also, in the interest of security the owner may ask visitors to identify themselves and state their general purpose for visiting. The owner may not prevent migrant workers from living with dignity or with associations which are customary to all citizens.
EDWARDS V SIMS
(1929)
Brief Fact Summary. The entrance of a cave was located on Edwards, the Petitioner’s (Petitioner) property. The Petitioner operated a public exhibition of the cave. A dispute arose because the Petitioner’s neighbor, Lee (Lee), felt the cave might extend under his property.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Despite the historical principle that property ownership includes ownership of both the air above and the soil below real estate, there are certain cases, such as this, where a court of equity is empowered to make rulings which prevent the property from being used to the detriment of or interference with contiguous property and owners.
Facts. The entrance to the Great Onyx Cave was located on the Petitioner’s property. The Petitioner opened the cave to exploitation and public show. Lee owned the neighboring property. In an underlying case, Lee sued the Petitioner to compel a survey of the cave to determine whether any portion of the cave fell within the boundaries of Lee’s property. In that case, the Respondent here, Chancellor Sims (Respondent) ordered a survey. The Petitioner appealed that ruling and the Court of Appeals found the appeal was filed prematurely. The Petitioner, being aggrieved, filed the instant case in the form of a Petition for Writ of Prohibition against Chancellor Sims, who was sitting as the court of equity.

Issue. Does the Court have the right to order the invasion of Petitioner’s land, for the purpose of conducting a survey, to determine conclusively the rights between two landowners in a dispute before the Court?

Held. Yes. The Writ of Prohibition is denied.
A Writ of Prohibition is an extraordinary remedy only issued upon certain proof. Under the provisions of the Kentucky Constitution, the Petitioner must show either (i) the inferior court has no jurisdiction and there is no remedy through appeal, and (ii) the inferior court possesses jurisdiction, but is exceeding its authority, or is about to exercise its power erroneously, and which would result in “great injustice and irreparable injury” to Petitioner where the Petitioner has no remedy by appeal or otherwise. Here, the Court holds the inferior court (Chancellor Sims), has jurisdiction over both the parties and subject matter. Therefore, this Court is concerned only whether the inferior court’s order was erroneous.
The Court finds this case to be one of first impression. In a prior case the Court held that one person may own surface rights and another may own cave rights, but that such a situation is not present here. Petitioner Edwards has what appears to be an undivided absolute right of ownership of the property. The Court also notes the historical principle that a property owner owns the sky above, the surface, and also the soil beneath his land. The Court observes, ordinarily such a right cannot be interfered with. Yet the Court finds that there are limitations on the historical doctrine.
The Court compared this case to one involving mines. The Court noted that in the case concerning mines, the Court of Equity had the right to order by injunction an inspection of the mine. A prerequisite to the inspection was a showing of reasonable suspicion the mine was intruding on a neighbor’s property. The Court found this analogy persuasive. In the mine case, the inspection is ordered to determine whether minerals are being extracted from the neighbor’s property, whereas in the case at bar, the inspection is ordered to determine whether the Petitioner is trespassing on the property of Lee. The Court finds that the power of the Chancellor to make such an order of inspection must be accompanied by (i) a bona fide claim and (ii) the Defendant to such a suit is accorded the opportunity to be heard. Both of those conditions were met in this case.
The Court refused to issue the Writ of Prohibition, meaning the inspection of the Petitioner’s property occurred. The Court found that the lower court had not exceeded its jurisdiction, therefore, no consideration had to be given to whether the Petitioner would suffer an irreparable injury as the result of the lower court’s order.

Dissent. The Dissent would hold that since the effect of the lower court’s order is to injure Edwards while no risk of injury is borne by Lee the case is wrongly decided. Also, that the surface land where the mouth of the cave is found should make the entirety of the cave the property of the person who owns the mouth. Further, no one should be allowed to own anything which they cannot subject to their dominion.

Discussion. The important principle from this case is that the right of a property owner is not absolute and that courts will, in rare instances, find exceptions to common-law historical maxims. It is useful also to consider the extraordinary remedy of the Writ of Prohibition, along with the requirements for issuance
JACQUE V STEENBERG
1997 Wisconsin case in which the court awarded $100k in punitive damages against a man who willfully moved a trailer across P's land over P's objection. Court order $1 in nominal damages and $100k in Punitive)
Punitive Damage used as deterrent though there was no actual damages.
Gruen v Gruen
In order for an inter vivos gift to be valid, there must be intent on the part of the donor to make a gift, delivery by the donor to the donee and acceptance of the gift by the donee. An inter vivos gift requires that the donor intend to make an irrevocable present transfer of ownership. Delivery of the gift can be by physical delivery or constructive delivery, sufficient to divest the donor of dominion of the property. Acceptance by the donee will be presumed when the gift is of value to the donee.
Facts - Plaintiff sought declaration that he was the rightful owner of a painting allegedly given to him by his father though he never took possession.

Issue. Whether a valid intervivos gift of a chattel may be made where the donor has reserved a life estate in the chattel and the donee never has had physical possession of it before the donor’s death?

Held. Affirmed. A valid intervivos gift was made as the donor intended to make a gift to his son, only constructive delivery was needed as actual delivery of the painting to the Plaintiff would have defeated the donor’s intent to retain a life estate in the painting and acceptance is deemed presumed as it is a benefit to the donee.
Sheridan Suzuki, Inc. v. Caruso Auto Sales
Rule of Law. The common law rule that a thief could never pass good title has been supplanted by the statutory rule that a person receiving goods incident to a transaction involving a dishonored check receives only voidable title. A bona fide purchaser for value can receive good title from a person with voidable title so long as other statutory requirements are met.
Issue. Did Bouton possess any title that could be passed on to Defendant in a manner which creates legal protection for Defendant as a bona fide purchaser?

Fact Summary. Plaintiff Sheridan Suzuki sold a motorcycle to Ronald Bouton, who paid with a bad check and then sold the vehicle to Defendant Caruso Auto Sales the following day.

Held. No. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.
At common law a thief could pass no title whatsoever to stolen goods. However, that rule has been supplanted by the Uniform Commercial Code with respect to goods received “in exchange for a check that was later dishonored.” [U.C.C. Section:2-403]. The common law rule is that the buyer of stolen goods from a thief has void title. Under the U.C.C., the buyer of goods that were obtained by a bad check has a “voidable” title, at best. A bona fide purchaser for value can obtain good title from a person with “voidable” title under the U.C.C.
In order to determine what form of title Bouton had in the motorcycle the Court considers not only the U.C.C. definitions, but also those of the statutory scheme which deals specifically with the titling of motor vehicles. The Court finds that, insofar as different results occur between the two portions of code, the particularized statute of the motor vehicle title scheme will be applied over the general statute of the U.C.C.
In the New York statute regarding the titling of motor vehicles, the procedures are more than mere record keeping and amount to a “quasi- judicial” determination of one’s ownership of a motor vehicle. The mere act of applying for a Certificate of Title is not sufficient to create good or complete title. The final determination of the department must be made upon the application documents submitted. Here the process was interrupted prior to completion, and thus Bouton never possessed the Certificate of Title. Therefore, the lack of perfected title in Bouton prevents Defendant from claiming to be a bona fide purchaser for value.
Defendant also alleges that Plaintiff’s assurance by telephone call that Bouton had in fact purchased the motorcycle from Plaintiff creates an equitable estoppel defense against the Plaintiff. The Court rejects this argument because the Defendant never had any right to the property in question, and thus, has not been denied any right.
The Court noted the public policy of preventing fraud in the purchases of motor vehicles. The Court found that Defendant had taken a risk which could not be afforded legal protection.
Isle Royal Mining Co. v. Hertin
Rule of Law. Because mistake is not a defense to trespass, no affirmative right may be created through such trespass, and the rule of title by accession is inapplicable due to the minimal difference in value between the standing wood and the cut wood.
Fact Summary. Plaintiffs mistakenly cut wood on land owned by Defendant mining company and placed the wood by a lake, which Defendant then took possession of and disposed of for its own purposes.
Chapin v. Freeland
Rule of Law. A purchaser is entitled to stand in as good a position as that of the seller in determining whether the remedy of replevin has passed by terms of the statute of limitations.
Issue. Should Plaintiff be dispossessed of the counters when the statute of limitations for replevin had passed under the previous shop owner?

Fact Summary. Two counters belonging to Defendant were put in a shop built by Warner and mortgaged to DeWitt. DeWitt foreclosed and sold the premises to Plaintiff, and Defendant came and retrieved the counters.

Held. No. Exceptions sustained. (New trial ordered).
The Court first explained that the lower court’s decision was based on the principle that although the six year statute of limitations had run in favor of either Warner or DeWitt, the transfer of the shop to Plaintiff began a new period of time under the statue (tolling of the statute). Thus, the lower court held that the Defendant could lawfully take back the counters, and Plaintiff could not sue the Defendant so long as Defendant was the original owner. The Court held this to be an erroneous statement of the law.

Dissent. The dissent would strictly construct the language of the statute of limitations to mean that the statute is tolled each time the shop is sold.
Anderson v. Gouldberg
Rule of Law. Possession of property, even when not rightful, is good against all persons except for the rightful owner.
Issue. Does the bare possession of property, though wrongfully obtained, enable the possessor to establish title sufficient to maintain an action in replevin against a stranger who takes the property from him?

Fact Summary. Plaintiff cut logs without authority on land which was not his and then took the logs to a mill where Defendants (who were strangers) obtained the logs.

Held. Yes. Order denying Defendant’s motion for new trial affirmed.
The Court cites the rule established by Armory v. Delamirie, infra, as authority on the point. The Court notes that when it is said that the Plaintiff’s possession of an object sought through replevin must be lawful, it only means that such possession must be lawful as against the party from whom replevin in sought.
Defendant argues that possession only raises a presumption of title which is rebuttable. The Court agrees but notes that a defendant who seeks to rebut such a presumption must establish that he has superior title over the plaintiff, or that he is connected with someone who has superior title over the plaintiff. In this case, Defendant had no superior claim of title in the logs, and could not simply take them from Plaintiff without Plaintiff’s, or the rightful owner’s, permission.
The Court noted that giving possession of the logs to Defendant would be to encourage wrongdoing. This is based on the public policy of limiting unlawful seizures and reprisals.
Allen v. Hyatt Regency- Nashville Hotel
Rule of Law. A bailment for hire was created in this case and when there was non-delivery the Appellee (Plaintiff) was entitled to the presumption of negligence provided by statute
Fact Summary. Appellee (Plaintiff) parked his car in a single entrance/ single exit parking garage taking a ticket and leaving his car locked. When he returned his car was gone.

Held. Yes. Judgment affirmed.
The Court must determine the legal relationship created by the parking of the car in the garage. First, the Court examined the status of the law in other jurisdictions, noting that New Jersey courts have adopted a rule outside of the traditional bailment concepts in park-and-lock cases. In New Jersey, the owner of a garage is subject to a presumption of negligence upon proof that a car parked in the defendant’s garage was damaged. The New Jersey approach shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to prove that there was no breach of a standard of reasonable care. The Tennessee Court here rejected such an approach although it noted that the same policy considerations were present in both rules.
The Court found that a bailment for hire was created in this case when the property was left in Appellant’s (Defendant) parking garage. A bailment is created when the owner of a chattel gives custody and control over the chattel to another to hold until the owner requests delivery. The bailee (or recipient) is under an obligation to return the object. In this case the failure of Appellant (Defendant) to deliver the car upon Appellee’s (Plaintiff) return subjected the Appellant to a statutory presumption of negligence. The Court noted that the fact that Appellee (Plaintiff) kept the keys to the vehicle raised a question as to the completeness of the bailment, but resolved the question in favor of Appellee (Plaintiff). Thus, the burden of proof shifted to Appellant (Defendant), who did not endeavor to prove a lack of negligence in this case.
The Court recognizes the difficulty of establishing a rule to govern all cases involving parking lots. The Court found that the facts here were sufficient to establish more than a mere licensor-licensee relationship. Thus, the Appellee (Plaintiff) was entitled to recover damages for the non-delivery of the car.

Dissent. The dissent would hold that a bailment is created only when the owner of a parking garage has knowingly and voluntarily assumed custody and control of a motor vehicle. The mere act of taking a ticket upon exit is not sufficient to “return” a bailment, because the attendant was not required to particularly identify the object of the bailment, but only to compute the amount of money owed for the time on the ticket.
McAvoy v. Medina
Facts Summary McAvoy (P) saw and took a pocketbook lying on a table in Medina’s (D) barbershop. He gave it to Medina to hold for the true owner but the true owner was never found. McAvoy demanded the pocketbook from Medina, who refused, asserting ownership of the pocketbook. P sued, the court entered judgment in favor of D, and P appealed.
Issues: 1) Is property left accidentally in a shop lost or mislaid property? 2) Who has rights in the property, the finder or the owner?

Facts Summary McAvoy (P) saw and took a pocketbook lying on a table in Medina’s (D) barbershop. He gave it to Medina to hold for the true owner but the true owner was never found. McAvoy demanded the pocketbook from Medina, who refused, asserting ownership of the pocketbook. P sued, the court entered judgment in favor of D, and P appealed.

Holding and Rule: 1) Property left accidentally in a shop is mislaid property. 2) The owner of the shop has rights in the property.
Hannah v. Peel
Holding and Rule
The finder of lost property has superior title against the owner of the land on which it was found.
Issue
Who has superior title to lost property that is found on land owned by another?



Facts Summary Peel (D) bought a home in 1938 but never moved in. In 1940, during World War II, Peel’s home was used by the military. Hannah (P) was a lance-corporal in the Royal Artillery stationed in the house. Hannah found a brooch on a windowsill in a room in a remote part of the house that was being used as a sickbay.

Hannah gave the brooch to the police. In 1942 the police gave it to Peel who then sold it for 66 pounds. There was no evidence that Peel knew of the existence of the brooch before Hannah discovered it. Hannah sued to regain possession of the brooch or its value and Peel in turn asserted that he had superior title because the brooch was found on his property.

The court considered the authorities and adopted the rule of Bridges v. Hawkesworth. In Bridges, the plaintiff found money in Hawkesworth’s shop and left it with him in case the true owner returned. After three years Bridges sued for its return and the court ruled in his favor, holding that the finder of lost property has superior title to all but the true owner.

While a man possesses everything attached to or under his land, he does not necessarily possess a thing lying unattached on the surface. There is no doubt that the brooch was lost property. Peel had neither prior possession of the brooch nor possession of the premises in which it was found at any time.
Armory v Delamirie
Holding
The priority of rights to possession say that a finder has better title to property that he or she finds over everyone except the true owner, thus Armory had full title to the jewel. The Court found in favour of Armory. Since the jewel was not produced at the trial, Armory was awarded the maximum value that a jewel of that form could have (under the principle that a wrongdoer should not be able to derive gain, i.e. uncertainty of damages, from the effects of his wrongdoing).
Issue whether either party had any property rights to the jewel

Facts Summary Armory was a chimney sweep's boy who found a jewel in the setting of a ring. He took the jewel to the shop of Delamirie, a goldsmith, to obtain a valuation of the item. An apprentice, the agent of Delamirie, surreptitiously removed the gems from the setting on the pretense of weighing it. The apprentice returned with the empty setting and informed Armory that it was worth three halfpence. The apprentice offered to pay him for it but Armory refused and asked the apprentice to return the stones and setting in their prior condition. The apprentice returned the socket of the jewel without the gems. Armory brought an action against Delamirie in trover (via respondeat superior for the actions of his apprentice)
Shelley v. Kraemer
Holding The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from enforcing restrictive covenants that would prohibit a person from owning or occupying property based on race or color.
Issues First, are racially-based restrictive covenants legal under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution? Secondly, can they be enforced by a court of law?

Facts Summary In 1945, a black family by the name of Shelley purchased a house in St. Louis, Missouri. At the time of purchase, they were unaware that a restrictive covenant had been in place on the property since 1911. The restrictive covenant barred "people of the Negro or Mongolian Race" from occupying the property. Louis Kraemer, who lived ten blocks away from the purchased housing, sued to restrain the Shelleys from taking possession of the property they had purchased. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the covenant was enforceable against the purchasers because the covenant was a purely private agreement between the original parties thereto, which "ran with the land" and was enforceable against subsequent owners; since the restriction purported to run in favor of an estate rather than merely a person, it could be enforced against third parties.

The United States Supreme Court held that racially-based restrictive covenants are, on their face, invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment. Private parties may voluntarily abide by the terms of a restrictive covenant but may not seek judicial enforcement of such a covenant because enforcement by the courts would constitute state action. Since such state action would necessarily be discriminatory, the enforcement of a racially-based restrictive covenant in a state court would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Johnson v. M'Intosh
Rule Johnson's lessees cannot eject M'Intosh because their title, derived from private purchases from Native Americans, could not be valid
Thomas Johnson bought land from Piankeshaw Native American tribes in 1773 and 1775. The plaintiffs were lessees of Thomas Johnson's descendants, who had inherited the land. The defendant, William M'Intosh (fur trader) (pronounced "McIntosh"), subsequently obtained a land patent, according to the facts as Marshall accepted them, to this same land from the United States federal government. In fact, the two parcels did not overlap at all. Further, there is evidence that the parties were aware the tracts did not overlap and purposely misrepresented the facts to the court in order to obtain a ruling

Holding Marshall, writing for a unanimous court, affirmed the dismissal.
Marshall begins with a lengthy discussion of history of the European discovery of the Americas and the legal foundations of the American Colonies. In particular, Marshall focuses on the manner in which each European power acquired land from the indigenous occupants. Synthesizing the law of nations, Marshall traces the outlines of the "discovery doctrine"—namely, that a European power gains radical title (also known as sovereignty) to the land it discovers. As a corollary, the discovering power gains the exclusive right to extinguish the "right of occupancy" of the indigenous occupants, which otherwise survived the assumption of sovereignty.
Marshall further opined that when they declared independence from Great Britain, the United States government inherited the British right of preemption over Native American lands. The legal result is that the only Native American conveyances of land which can create valid title are sales of land to the federal government
Cole v. Steinlauf
Rule of Law. The defect in title alleged herein by Plaintiffs is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to the soundness of the title, and the Plaintiffs should not be forced to buy a potential lawsuit due to the alleged defect.
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Cole v. Steinlauf

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Citation. 22 Ill.144 Conn. 629, 136 A.2d 744 (1957)
Brief Fact Summary. The Plaintiffs and the Defendant entered into a contract for the sale of real estate, for which the Plaintiffs made a deposit of $420 and spent $50 to hire an attorney to make a title search prior to the closing date. The title search found a defect in title and Plaintiffs refused to buy the property, after which Defendants refused to return the deposit.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The defect in title alleged herein by Plaintiffs is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to the soundness of the title, and the Plaintiffs should not be forced to buy a potential lawsuit due to the alleged defect.

Facts. The Plaintiffs and the Defendant entered into a contract for the sale of real estate, for which the Plaintiffs made a deposit of $420 and spent $50 to hire an attorney to make a title search prior to the closing date of July 1, 1955. The title search found a defect in title and Plaintiffs refused to buy the property, after which Defendants refused to return the deposit. The attorney found that a deed to a predecessor in title to the Defendant made in 1945 had ran to the grantee “and assigns forever.” No mention of “heirs” was made as would be customary and necessary in a fee simple conveyance made in Connecticut. The Plaintiffs, on the basis that the prior deed failed to mention “heirs,” refused to close the deal with Defendant and demanded that Defendant return the deposit of $420 plus expenses for the title search, which the parties agreed had cost $50. The Plaintiffs sued to recover the deposit and the cost of the title search. The trial court found the issues for the Defen
dant on the basis that the former deed did convey a fee simple title. The Plaintiff appealed.

Issue. Does the 1945 deed convey the totality of the fee to the grantee without a defect which would render the title offered to the Plaintiffs unmarketable

Fact Summary. The Plaintiffs and the Defendant entered into a contract for the sale of real estate, for which the Plaintiffs made a deposit of $420 and spent $50 to hire an attorney to make a title search prior to the closing date. The title search found a defect in title and Plaintiffs refused to buy the property, after which Defendants refused to return the deposit.

Held. No. Judgment reversed and set aside, remanded with instructions to find for Plaintiff and award $470.
The Court noted that the law of the jurisdiction was that, in order to convey an estate of inheritance in land by deed, it is necessary to include the word “heirs.” The Court found that the common law rule was in effect which was that a grant to a grantee “and his assigns forever” vests only a life estate in the grantee. In other words the grantee may assign the property, but at his death, the title of the property could arguably revert back to the grantor.
The Court found that there was an exception to the common law rule requiring the word “heirs” in a deed, which was that where the intent of the parties to a defective grant can be conclusively established as intending to create a conveyance of a fee, the deed can be reformed to vest a fee in the grantee. Here, the Court pointed out that the necessary parties to an adjudication regarding the intent of the parties to the 1945 deed were not present, and that the case could not be decided on the basis of the intent of the parties to the 1945 deed.
The Court held that there was a reasonable doubt as to the marketability of the title which the Defendants wished to convey to the Plaintiffs, and that it would not be just to require the Plaintiffs to accept the potentiality of a lawsuit where the title is not marketable.
Concurrence. The concurrence pointed out that the intent of the parties to the 1945 deed could be shown in a proceeding at equity, but that since the only issue presented was whether the Plaintiffs were being offered marketable title by Defendant, that this was not the proper forum for such an adjudication.
Moore v. Phillips
Rule of Law. A life tenant is considered by law to be a quasi-trustee for the benefit of the remaindermen and there is a duty imposed by law to neither commit waste to the property held in life tenancy nor to permit waste to occur.
Issue. Are the claims raised by the remaindermen for waste filed eleven years after the creation of the life estate (and the death of the life tenant) barred by laches or estoppel?

Fact Summary. Leslie Brannan died owning land and a farmhouse, which he left to his wife a life estate, with the remainder interests to Dorothy Moore and Kent Reinhardt. During the lifetime of the life tenant the farmhouse was allowed to deteriorate and, upon the life tenant’s death, the remaindermen Moore and Kent filed suit against the estate of the life tenant for the waste of the farmhouse.

Held. No. Judgment of district court affirmed.
The Court first summarizes certain points of law which are necessary to the adjudication of the case. 1. A life tenant is considered to be a quasi-trustee of the estate for the remaindermen. 2. It is the life tenant’s duty to keep the property of the life estate in good repair. 3. Waste is a term describing neglect or misconduct, but does not refer to ordinary depreciation. 4. Waste is either voluntary or permissive (voluntary being an act of commission and permissive being an act of omission). 5. The remainderman may sue for waste in compensatory damages, for injunctive relief in equity, or for receivership. 6. A remainderman does not have to wait until the life tenant dies to bring his suit for damages from the waste caused by the life tenant. 7. Where the waste is characterized as permissive the injury is deemed to be continuing in nature and the statute of limitations does not run in favor of the life tenant until the end of the tenancy. 8. Laches or estoppel may, in certain cas
es, bar an action for waste.
Based on the evidence in this case the Court found that the defenses of laches or estoppel were properly rejected. The life tenant breached her duty to prevent waste to the property of the remaindermen. The preservation of the property was the chief duty of the life tenant.
The Court found that the majority of the waste occurred in the last two to three years of the life tenancy and that the remainderman Moore attempted to communicate her concerns about the deterioration of the property to the life tenant, who did nothing. Permissive waste to the property by the life tenant was proved in the lower court and as such was a continuing injury.
The Executrix (Defendant) could not defend the suit for damage resulting from waste to property held in life tenancy by Ada Brannan based on estoppel, which requires the defense to show prejudice resulting from the conduct of the delay in filing suit. No prejudice could be shown.
Johnson v. City of Wheat Ridge
Rule of Law. The breach of a condition subsequent does not cause title to automatically revert to the grantor or his heirs and that no undue influence could be shown in the original conveyances
Issue. Has the statute of limitations run such that the Plaintiff’s action to quiet title in himself on the lands conveyed under a condition subsequent is barred?

Fact Summary. In two separate conveyances Samuel Johnson conveyed land to the Wheat Ridge Lions Foundation (five acres) and to Jefferson County, for the custody and management of the Wheat Ridge Recreation Department (fourteen acres), subject to the condition subsequent that the land was to be used for a public park named for the grantor and that the fourteen acre grant was subject to the condition that public water supply and lavatories be placed on the premises within two years of the grant.
Kost v. Foster
Rule of Law. The remainder is a vested remainder in those remaindermen in being at the time of the deed where there is no clause inserted in the conveyance which would make the remainder subject to divestment
Issue. Was the interest of Oscar Kost a vested remainder at the time of the purported sale by the trustee in bankruptcy?

Fact Summary. The property in question was conveyed by warranty deed in 1897 as a life estate for Ross Kost with the property at his death (1949) to go to his lawful child or children. At the time of the deed Ross Kost had five children, and at the time of his death he had seven living children. One of the children was bankrupt in 1936 and the trustee of the bankruptcy court conveyed his interest to one Marshall Foster.

Held. Yes. Decree affirmed (Marshall Foster is owner of an undivided one-seventh interest of the land and a partition is ordered).
Oscar Kost contends that he had only a contingent remainder in the property and that a contingent remainder does not pass to a trustee during the bankruptcy of the remainderman. The Court began by distinguishing the vested remainder from the contingent remainder. In the case of a vested remainder there is a person in being (at the time of the 1897 deed, Oscar was living) who has a present right to future enjoyment which is not dependent on any uncertain event or contingency. In this case, the remainder in Oscar Kost was vested at the time of the 1897 deed, subject only to diminishment should Ross Kost have children after 1897.
To determine whether an interest is contingent or vested depends on the language employed in the deed. If the conditional element of the gift over is incorporated into the description of or into the gift to the remaindermen, then the remainder is conditional.
However, when the gift over is vested (as it was here for Oscar Kost), and then immediately followed by language which makes it subject to being divested, then the remainder is vested. In this case Oscar’s interest vested at the time of the deed in 1897, since he was alive. By the language of the deed Oscar, if he died during the life of the life tenant, then his children would receive his share. The Court found that this language meant that the remainder was a vested remainder.
The Court found that since Oscar Kost had a vested remainder at the time of his 1936 bankruptcy, the trustee could properly convey to Foster the interest of Kost, which at the time of the death of the life tenant became an undivided one-seventh interest. The Court found that Foster, by trustee’s deed in 1936, acquired the aforementioned undivided one-seventh interest in the fee of the real estate, subject to the life estate of Ross Kost and subject to the easements.
Sybert v. Sybert
Rule of Law. The rule in Shelley’s case applies to create a fee simple interest in Fred Sybert, even though the intent of the testator was to create a life estate, because the gift over is to the “heirs of his body.”
Issue. Does the rule in Shelley’s case apply here such that the estate Fred Sybert received under the devise from J.H. Sybert is a fee simple rather than a life estate?

Fact Summary. Fred Sybert, by wills from his father and mother, received a conveyance of property which was described by the testator to be a life estate only with the gift over of the remainder in fee to “heirs of his body.”

Held. Yes. Judgment affirmed.
This Court has adopted the rule in Shelley’s case as stated by Kent which basically may be restated as follows: Whenever a person takes an estate under a deed or other conveyance and in the same document there is a limitation, by way of remainder, of an interest of the same legal quality where the heirs or heirs of the ancestor are to take in succession; then the rule in Shelley’s case will be applied to create a fee simple in the ancestor. The Court found that the rule is based on the requirement that the purported gift over of a remainder interest must specifically state “heirs” or “heirs of his body.”
The rule is that, unless there is some qualifying language, showing that the words “heirs of his body” were not used in their technical sense, the rule in Shelley’s case must apply. In this case the Court found that the original devise to Fred Sybert used the words “heirs of his body” in their technical sense.
The Court cited previous decisions which held that the words “lawful issue” (similar to heirs of his body) were words of purchase, not limitation. Also, the Court distinguished this case from a case in which the devise in question was to “her bodily heirs, share and share alike.” In that case, the addition of “share and share alike” qualified the word heirs and took the case out of the rule.
Concurrence. The concurrence agreed with the result as being within the precedent of the jurisdiction, but noted that the rule in Shelley’s case is an ancient rule which came from English feudal times and should be abolished. The effect of the rule is to frustrate the intent of the testator who clearly expressed his desire that Fred Sybert should take only a life estate.
Capitol Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Smith
ule of Law. Based on the case of Shelley v. Kraemer, the state courts may not enforce such private racially restrictive covenants and the Plaintiffs title is thereby quieted.
Issue. Does the private racially restrictive covenant apply such that the Plaintiff’s property is subject to forfeit under the covenant’s provisions?

Fact Summary. The Plaintiffs, black people, assert ownership in this quiet title action of property which is purported to be under a racially restrictive covenant, Plaintiffs were seeking to have the cloud on title removed. The Defendants are property owners in the neighborhood who claim the Plaintiff’s property based on the forfeiture provisions in the racially restrictive covenant which provide that forfeiture will be made upon placement of a notice of claim, which Defendants did. The trial court found for the Plaintiffs and stated that to enforce this agreement would have been a per se violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Held. No. The judgment is affirmed.
The Defendants claimed that Shelley v. Kraemer, infra, was not controlling due to the fact that the court was not considering provisions relating to forfeiture or future interests in the land, which Defendants claimed were created by the terms of the racially restrictive covenant.
The Court found that regardless of how the Defendants sought to characterize the effects or operation of the covenant, the attempt was to deprive the Plaintiffs of a right protected by the U.S. Constitution.
The racially restrictive covenant is a nullity under Shelley v. Kraemer, infra, and its progeny, and no claim can ever be supported by law which would violate the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Matter of Estate of Vadney
Rule of Law. Under the statutory scheme in New York, a disposition of property to two or more persons is presumed to create a tenancy in common, unless it can be shown clear and convincing evidence that the intent of the grantor was to create a joint tenancy with right of survivorship.
Issue. What is the effect of the deed on the interests of the Petitioner and the Respondents, if any?

Fact Summary. In this case decedent Catherine Vadney executed a deed conveying her house to herself and her son, Peter Vadney, and the deed failed to describe the type of tenancy created and contained no survivorship language. When decedent’s estate was probated, Peter Vadney, executor, left the house out of the listing of assets of the decedent, and the decedent’s other three children contended that the deed created a tenancy in common which would mean that her one-half interest would pass to all her children, instead of just Peter, who would take the entire property under survivorship.

Held. The deed created a joint tenancy with right of survivorship. Affirmed.
The statutory scheme provides that a grant of property to two or more persons will create a tenancy in common, “unless expressly declared to be a joint tenancy.” Of course, this deed did not express any type of tenancy or right (or non-right) of survivorship. The Court found that this statute created a presumption in favor of tenancy in common which could be overcome only upon the showing of clear and convincing evidence of an intent by the grantor to create a joint tenancy.
The Petitioner, Peter Vadney, had met the burden of showing that his mother intended to create a joint tenancy with right of survivorship as between them in the house. The attorney who drafted the deed indicated that he had received instructions from the decedent to create such an interest and that he omitted such language in the deed through his own oversight. The drafting attorney produced handwritten notes which indicated the decedent’s intent. Also, the attorney’s wife, who was present during the execution of the deed testified that the decedent had indicated her desire to leave the house to Peter, the Petitioner.
The Court found that unless the decedent specifically meant to exclude the house from the assets which would pass under her estate, she would not have needed to execute the deed at all.
Mann v. Bradley
Rule of Law. An ownership as joint tenancy may be converted to one of tenancy in common by the mutual agreement or by the actions of the parties from which an intent to treat the ownership as tenants in common may be inferred.
Issue. Did the property settlement agreement in the divorce action have the effect of converting the joint tenancy into a tenancy in common?

Fact Summary. Betty Mann and Aaron Mann, a married couple, owned a family residence in joint tenancy during their marriage. The couple divorced in 1971 and as part of their divorce entered into an agreement which provided that the family residence should be sold and the proceeds be equally divided between Betty and Aaron upon the occurrence of either the remarriage of Betty, when the youngest child of the couple reached twenty one, or the mutual agreement of Betty and Aaron to sell. Betty lived in the residence with the children until her death in 1972 at which time the Petitioner Aaron Mann told his children that he now owned the house by virtue of the right of survivorship in the joint tenancy with Betty.

Yes. Affirmed.
The Petitioner Aaron Mann argued that the provisions of the property settlement agreement indicate the parties intent to keep the property as a joint tenancy unless one of the three listed contingencies occurred. The Petitioner argued that since none of the three listed events happened prior to Betty’s death, the house belongs to him by right of survivorship. The Court finds that the modern view is that the courts not require the act of the co-tenant to be destructive of one of the traditional four unities of time, title, possession and interest in order for the joint tenancy to terminate.
The newer view is that the joint tenancy may terminate by mutual agreement (such as this case) when the parties treated the ownership interest as a tenancy in common. The Court cited authority for the proposition that the parties’ intention to treat their ownership as tenants in common may be inferred from their actions.
Because the provisions of the property settlement agreement in the divorce provided for the sale of the property and the equal division of the proceeds therefrom, the intent of the parties to treat their ownership as a tenancy in common is manifest.
The Court found that to hold that the provisions of the property settlement agreement in the divorce left the ownership as a joint tenancy with right of survivorship is contrary to common sense. The Court cited a case which stated that, since the parties were having martial problems, it would be hard to fathom that they would have entered into an agreement by which the bulk of their estate would pass to the other upon their death.
Mercer v. Wayman
Rule of Law. The rule is well settled that the mere possession by one tenant in common who receives all the rents and profits and pays the taxes assessed against the property, no matter how long a period, cannot be set up as a bar against the cotenants.
Issue. Are the Defendants’ claims barred by the statute of limitations?

Fact Summary. This case involved a dispute between the Plaintiffs, the widow and children of Fred Mercer, deceased (Plaintiffs) and the Defendants, surviving sons of Lora Wayman, deceased, and the widow and daughter of Verne Wayman, deceased (Defendants), to set aside oil and gas leases by the Defendants and to have the Plaintiffs declared the sole owners of the 40 acre tract in question.

Held. No. Reversed.
The rule is well settled that the mere possession by one tenant in common who receives all the rents and profits and pays the taxes assessed against the property, no matter how long a period, cannot be set up as a bar against the cotenants. The possession of one cotenant is considered by law to be possession by all the cotenants.
In order for the possession by one cotenant to become adverse to another cotenant, there must be a disseizen or ouster by some outward act of ownership of an unequivocal character, overt and notorious, and of such nature to impart notice to the cotenant that an adverse possession and disseizen is asserted by the tenant in possession.
The deed to Fred Mercer and wife was ineffective to convey the Defendants’, then minors, interests in the land. Thus, such deed did not constitute color of title and the seven-year statute of limitations (tax title) was inapplicable.
The Plaintiffs, although in possession for thirty-four years, never made any overt act, which would serve as notice to the cotenants that they were claiming adversely to them. The Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of proof.
Brown v. Southall Realty Co
Rule of Law. A contract which is knowingly entered into concerning premises which are known to violate the housing regulations will not be enforceable and the contract will be void
Issue. Was the lease agreement void and unenforceable as an illegal contract?

Fact Summary. Appellee, landlord, brought an action for possession against the Appellant, Brown, for rent in arrears of $230. Brown contended that no rent was due under the lease because the lease was an illegal contract, where landlord, with knowledge of housing regulations violations, entered into the lease with Brown stating that the premises were habitable in spite of the violations.

Held. Yes. Judgment reversed.
The Court notes that the lease was entered into by the landlord with knowledge of the housing code violations and that the premises had not been maintained such that the premises were healthy and safe.
The general rule is that an illegal contract, made in violation of a statutory prohibition designed for regulatory purposes, is void and confers no right on the wrongdoer. The Court finds that the housing regulations contain a statutory prohibition against the lease of premises which violate the housing code.
The Court held that where, as here, the conditions of violations of the housing code on a leasehold exist prior to an agreement to lease, there is a violation of the housing regulations and that the housing regulations are “implied prohibitions” which render the prohibited act void. The lease agreement will be treated as any other contract for this purpose.
Jancik v. Department of Housing and Urban Development
Rule of Law. The FHA is violated where an ad for housing suggests to an ordinary reader that a particular group is preferred or dispreferred for the housing in question, which may be proven by subjective evidence of the intent of the person who places the ad.
Fact Summary. Jancik, Petitioner, owns an apartment building, and ran an ad in a newspaper which was claimed by the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities to violate provisions of the Fair Housing Act (FHA).

Issue. Does Jancik’s ad violate the FHA provisions such that the words “mature person preferred” indicate a non-preference of a particular protected group?
Adrian v. Rabinowitz
Rule of Law. When a lease term is to commence in the future, the lessor undertakes an implied duty to make the premises available and open to the lessee’s entry on the first day of the lease term.
Issue. Did the lease contract impose on the lessor a duty of putting the tenant in actual and legal possession of the premises at the beginning of the lease term?

Fact Summary. Defendant Rabinowitz leased store premises to Plaintiff Adrian to commence on a date certain, and after the payment of the first month’s rent by Plaintiff, the premises were not available due to a hold over tenant.

Held. Yes, but the Judgment must be reversed on the basis that the lower court incorrectly computed the damages.
Because the express covenant for quiet enjoyment is generally interpreted to secure the lessee from acts of hindrance performed by the lessor or his agents, the express covenant does not protect the lessee from interference by strangers with his possession. Therefore, for Plaintiff to prevail the duty must be implied.
The Court considers the question of whether the lessor is under a duty to put the premises in actual and legal possession of the lessee at the beginning of the term and finds that there is such a duty. The Court finds favor with the English rule which states that when the term of lease is set to commence in the future, there is an implied undertaking by the lessor that the premises shall be open to the lessee’s entry, legally and actually, when the time for possession arrives. The Court finds that other American jurisdictions impose such a duty.
The actions of the lessor (Defendant) in evicting the hold over tenant is evidence that the lessor was acting as if there were a duty to deliver actual and legal possession to the Plaintiff lessee at the commencement of the lease.
The Court found that the lower court made an error with regard to the computation of damages. The lower court found that the Plaintiff would have disposed of at least $2,800 worth of seasonal merchandise during the time the premises were unavailable, and that Plaintiff was compelled to sell the merchandise at 25% below cost. The Court found this formulation to be far too speculative and that the proper formulation of damages should be the difference between the actual rental value and rent reserved for the period of the deprivation of possession.
The Court ruled that parol evidence could be adduced to prove that additional damages should be awarded to Plaintiff as the result of the breach, but that based on the evidence in the record, Plaintiff did not make a showing that would justify the application of such evidence to determine damages. Further, that the business was a new venture which failed prior to the ending of the first rent term, and that shows the uncertainty of measuring damages for loss of the opportunity to sell seasonal goods.
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island
Rule of Law A claimant does not waive his right to challenge a regulation as an uncompensated taking by purchasing property after the enactment of the regulation challenged.
Issue Did the State Supreme Court err in holding that Petitioner did not have standing to a claim in a regulatory taking because he acquired the proper after the enactment of regulations? Did Petition endure a total take if some of the parcel remains economically viable?

Holding
The Court held that the Rhode Island Supreme Court erred in holding that Petitioner did not have standing to sue because he acquired the property after the enactment of regulations. The Court did not fully address the issue of whether Rhode Island Supreme Court correctly held that Petitioner did not endure a total taking because some of the parcel remains economically usable.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.
Rule/Holding When the character of the governmental action is a permanent physical occupation of property, the government actions effects taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner.
Loretto, on behalf of all property owners so situated, sued Manhattan Teleprompter for trespass and—insofar as Teleprompter relied on § 828—a taking without just compensation, and requested damages and injunctive relief. N.Y. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute and rendered summary judgment for Manhattan Teleprompter and co-defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Holding
The Court held that the Manhattan Teleprompter's minor but permanent physical occupation of Loretto's property constitutes a regulatory taking of property for which just compensation is due under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.
[edit]Reasoning
The Court argued as follows: (1) Precedent. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City held that there is no set formula for finding a taking. Pumpelly held that a physical presence with the effect of impairing property's usefulness is a taking. Recent cases focus on the importance of physical invasion as a taking. (2) Precedent and policy. The right to exclude is one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property. Insofar as invasion exists, it destroys each of these rights (to possess, to use, and to dispose). (3) Fairness. Owners have an expectation of privacy, without invasion. (4) Clarity. The invasion rule avoids ambiguity as to both law and fact. (5) Contrary to the assertion of the Manhattan Teleprompter and co-defendants, a physical occupation of only rental property does not make this less of a taking. (6) Contrary to the assertion of Manhattan Teleprompter and co-defendants, the statute in question does not purport to give the tenant any additional right. (7) Contrary to the assertion of Manhattan Teleprompter and co-defendants, this ruling will not reverse the Court's otherwise broad discretion rendered to states in regulating landlord/tenant relationships.
[edit]Notable concurring and dissenting opinions
Blackmun, J., with whom Brennan, J., and White, J., join, dissenting.
The minority opinion argued that there should not be an automatic rule to determine whether there is a taking, and definitely not one that draws the artificial distinction between temporary and permanent physical presence. Instead, there should be a multi-factor balancing test that considers (1) whether the State has interfered in some minimal way with the use of space on her building, and also (2) the extent of the State's interference, and whether it is so severe as to constitute a compensable taking.
Kelo v. City of New London
Rule of Law Taking of property from one private owner to another private owner in furtherance of economic development constitutes a permissable "public use" under the 5th and 14th
Facts - The case arose in the context of condemnation by the city of New London, Connecticut, of privately owned real property, so that it could be used as part of a “comprehensive redevelopment plan.” However, the private developer was unable to obtain financing and abandoned the redevelopment project, leaving the land as an empty lot, which was eventually turned into a temporary dump

Holding
The governmental taking of property from one private owner to give to another in furtherance of economic development constitutes a permissible "public use" under the Fifth Amendment. Supreme Court of Connecticut decision affirmed.
Britton v. Town of Chester
Rule of Law. A successful plaintiff is entitled to relief, which rewards his or her efforts in testing the legality of the ordinance and prevents retributive action by the municipality, such as correcting the illegality.
Issue. Is the zoning ordinance constitutional?

Fact Summary. Plaintiffs challenged a zoning ordinance which provided for multi-family housing to be built only as part of a planned residential development, which required that multi-family housing include a variety of housing types, such as single-family homes, duplexes, and multi-family structures

Held. Yes. The court upholds the zoning ordinance since the effect of the lower court’s decision would leave the town without zoning. However, the court orders the town to remedy the portions of the ordinance, which deal with multi-family housing, and the court granted specific relief to the Plaintiffs, the potential builders. The court affirmed the decision in part, and reversed in part.
The statute, which allows for municipalities to adopt or amend a zoning ordinance requires that such an adoption or amendment be done “for the purpose of promoting the health, safety, or the general welfare of the community.” The court found that the portion of the zoning ordinance which deals with multi-family housing flew in the face of the general welfare condition of the state zoning statute, and that, as applied to this case, the ordinance was an invalid exercise of power delegated to the town.
The effect of the lower court’s ruling is to leave the town without zoning. The ordinance will be allowed to stay in effect for a reasonable time within which the town is ordered to correct the portions of the ordinance regarding multi-family housing.
A successful plaintiff is entitled to relief, which rewards his or her efforts in testing the legality of the ordinance and prevents retributive action by the municipality, such as correcting the illegality. This is a builder’s remedy, and does not benefit the plaintiff.
The builder’s remedy is appropriate in this case, both to compensate the developer who has invested substantial time and resources in pursuing this litigation, and as the most likely means of ensuring that low and moderate income housing is actually built.
Durant v. Town of Dunbarton
Rule of Law. The regulations of local planning boards are given a broad scope and generally may include provisions, which will tend to create conditions favorable to health, safety, convenience or prosperity.
Issue. Was the board within its rights to deny the Plaintiff’s plans for a new subdivision for the reasons stated?

Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff requested Defendant to approve her plans for a subdivision, which the Defendant’s planning board denied. The Plaintiff appealed the denial.

Held. Yes. Affirmed.
The court cited a statute, which authorized municipalities to grant their planning boards discretionary authority to approve or disapprove subdivision plans. Under the statute, the regulations of local planning boards are given a broad scope and generally may include provisions, which will tend to create conditions favorable to health, safety, convenience or prosperity.
Under the specific grant of authority for the Defendant, the denial could issue for lands, which were such that they could not be used safely for building purposes because of an exceptional danger to health. Also, the sub-divider was tasked with the responsibility to make sure that the land could have adequate septic systems.
The Plaintiff argued that the requirements of the planning board were unenforceable due to vagueness. The court found the regulations to be adequately specific to inform the sub-divider of the need to provide the planning board with enough information to show that no danger is posed by the subdivision proposed and that the septic systems can be supported.
The evidence showed that the New Hampshire Water Supply and Pollution Control Commission had approved of the subdivision plans prior to the planning board’s denial. However, the court found that the planning board was entitled to rely on its own investigation of the plans in denying the plans and that the denial was not arbitrary.
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.
The Court held that the zoning ordinance was not an unreasonable extension of the village's police power and did not have the character of arbitrary fiat, and thus it was not unconstitutional.
Facts Summary Ambler Realty owned 68 acres of land in the village of Euclid, a suburb of Cleveland. The village, in an attempt to prevent industrial Cleveland from growing into and subsuming Euclid and prevent the growth of industry which might change the character of the village, developed a zoning ordinance based upon 6 classes of use, 3 classes of height and 4 classes of area. The property in question was divided into three use classes, as well as various height and area classes, thereby hindering Ambler Realty from developing the land for industry. Ambler Realty sued the village, arguing that the zoning ordinance had substantially reduced the value of the land by limiting its use, amounting to a deprivation of Ambler's liberty and property without due process.

The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's denial of the dismissal motion, but overturned the outcome of the case and sided with the Village of Euclid. The Court held that the zoning ordinance was not an unreasonable extension of the village's police power and did not have the character of arbitrary fiat, and thus it was not unconstitutional.
Further, the Court found that Ambler Realty had offered no evidence that the ordinance had in fact had any effect on the value of the property in question, but based their assertions of depreciation on speculation only. The court ruled that speculation was not a valid basis for a claim of takings.
Ambler Realty had argued their case on the basis of the 14th Amendment's due process clause. The Court noted that the challenger in a due process case would have to show that the law in question is discriminatory and has no rational basis. The Court found that Euclid's zoning ordinance in fact did have a rational basis.
Planner and lawyer Alfred Bettman, supported by the Ohio Planning Conference (now APA-Ohio, A Chapter of the American Planning Association), submitted a friend of the court brief on behalf of Euclid, arguing that zoning is a form of nuisance control and therefore a reasonable police power measure.
United States v. Causby
Rule/Holding Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos has no legal authority in the United States when pertaining to the sky. A man does not have control and ownership over the airspace of their property except within reasonable limits to utilize their property. Airspace above a set minimum height is property of the Masses and no one man can accuse airplanes or other such craft within of trespassing on what they own.
Facts Summary Causby sued the United States for trespassing on his land, complaining specifically about how "low-flying military planes caused the plaintiffs' chickens to 'jump up against the side of the chicken house and the walls and burst themselves open and die' . . . The plaintiffs sued the government, arguing that they were entitled to compensation under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Holding The United States Supreme Court held in this case that "this doctrine has no place in the modern world,"[4] at least as far as air rights are concerned,[5] but it remains as a source of law to this day, or "fundamental to property rights in land."[2]:
The court's decision, authored by Justice William O. Douglas, could have resolved the case on a narrow ground by simply holding that there was a taking of land because the government's flights affected the land. Justice Douglas did reach that conclusion, but then he went much further and opined on what airspace landowners do and do not own. He wrote that "if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. Otherwise buildings could not be erected, trees could not be planted, and even fences could not be run" . . . Thus, a landowner "owns at least as much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the land," and invasions of that airspace "are in the same category as invasions of the surface."
Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys’ School
Rule of Law. A proprietor may make any reasonable use of the water of the stream in connection with his riparian estate and for lawful purposes within the watershed, provided he leaves the current of the stream diminished by no more than is reasonable, having regard for the rights of other riparian owners.
Issue Was the lower court’s instructions correct?
Fact Summary. Defendant owns land on a stream, which runs through Plaintiff’s mill. The Defendant operated a pump, which diverted 60,000 gallons of water each day from the stream to another of Defendant’s properties, the Mt. Hermon Boys’ School.

Held. No. Defendant’s exceptions are overruled.
A proprietor may make any reasonable use of the water of the stream in connection with his riparian estate and for lawful purposes within the watershed, provided he leave the current of the stream diminished by no more than is reasonable, having regard for the rights of other riparian owners.
If the riparian owner upstream diverts water from the stream out of the watershed or upon a disconnected estate the only question is whether there is actual injury to the lower estate for any present or future reasonable use. The diversion alone, without damages, does not warrant the imposition of even nominal damages.
The charge of the lower court was wrong, because it would have permitted recovery regardless of damages. However, the evidence showed that the damages to the Plaintiff’s estate were substantial.
Rose v. Chaikin
Rule of Law. A private nuisance is an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of one’s land.
Issue. Is the Defendants’ windmill a nuisance?

Fact Summary. Plaintiffs are landowners who are seeking to permanently enjoin the use of Defendants’ windmill, because they allege that the windmill is a nuisance.

Rose v. Chaikin

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Held. Yes. The windmill must be shut down, but the counterclaim against the Roses cannot stand as an actionable nuisance.
To determine a private nuisance, the court will consider the cases on a case-by-case basis, balancing the competing interests in property as required by law. A nuisance must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
The essence of a private nuisance is an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of land. The utility of Defendant’s conduct must be weighed against the quantum of harm to Plaintiff. The question is not simply whether someone is annoyed or disturbed, but whether the annoyance or disturbance arises from an unreasonable use of the neighbor’s land. Sans v. Ramsey Golf, 149 A.2nd 599 (N.J. 1959).
Unreasonableness is judged not according to exceptionally refined, uncommon or luxurious habits of living, but according to the simple tastes and unaffected notions generally prevailing among plain people. Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 104 N.E. 371 (Mass. 1914).
Noise, standing alone, may justify a finding of nuisance is two elements are present: 1) injury to the health and comfort of ordinary people in the vicinity; and 2) unreasonableness of that injury under all the circumstances. The court found that the Defendants’ windmill was a nuisance due to the noise level. However, the counterclaim against the Roses’ heat pump must fail because the heat pump was not operated as frequently or as long in duration as the windmill.
The zoning laws were found to be an alternate rationale for the court’s finding.
Finn v. Williams
Rule of Law. An easement by necessity may be given to an owner of a landlocked parcel over another person’s land in order for the owner to gain access to his land.
Issue. If the original landowner did not claim a right of way over an area of land before any sort of conveyance was made, can a claim for an easement by necessity still be made?

Fact Summary Charles Williams owned a large parcel of land. He conveyed a portion of it to Thomas Bacon. The rest was inherited by Zilphia Jane Williams (Defendant). The Finns (Plaintiff) bought the land belonging to Bacon. The only way for Plaintiff to get to a public road is by using a road through Defendant’s land because the only other available private road was closed. Plaintiff requests an easement by necessity over Defendant’s land.

Held. Yes.
Since there was at one time common ownership of the lands of Plaintiff and Defendant, an easement by necessity will remain over the lands of the original grantor. The right of way over the land is treated has having been dormant through the transfers of title, and can be used at any time by one of the landowners when no other means of access to a road exist. The easement is based on strict necessity, so it does not matter that the claim did not exist when the land were unified.
Mitchell v. Castellaw
Rule of Law. An easement was created here, even though the words in the deed are not words of inheritance or of legal character normally found in the creation of easements.
Issue. Does the reservation of the right to use the driveway reserved by Stapp pass to her devisee Plaintiff such that an easement is recognized?

Fact Summary. In this case the Plaintiff Castellaw had easements to land granted by the lower court and Defendant appealed on the basis that the easements should not have been granted.

Held.
There was no possibility of repugnance or conflict between the grant as a whole and the reservation of the driveway. The ordinary reader of the instrument would not be confused about what the grantor meant to alienate and what she intended to keep, and the Court refused to require that she expressly disclaim the possibility of a conflict.
The specific character of the reservation is evident from the limited physical area affected, the exact description of the area, its location at the very edge of the lot, the limited amount of rights reserved, and the fact that the rights were consistent with the usage of the property.
The easement will be considered to be an appurtenance of the lot upon which the gas station sits. The better rule is that neither words of inheritance nor other words of art are essential to the valid reservation of an appurtenant easement, even one that is unlimited.
United States National Bank of Oregon v. Homeland, Inc
Rule of Law. When a commercial tenant abandons leased property there is no automatic termination of the lease when the lessor subsequently re-lets the property, and the original lessee may still be held liable for the periods of time under the original lease that the premises were vacant.
Issue. There are two issues:
When a tenant to a commercial lease abandons the premises prior to the expiration of the lease and the lessor re-lets the premises for a longer term than the original lease and for more rent, does such re-letting as a matter of law terminate the original lease, freeing the original tenant from any claim for damages which occurred after the re-letting?
When a lease for commercial premises provides that, upon appointment of a receiver for tenant, the lessor may, without notice, terminate the lease, does the lessor’s re-letting of the premises terminate the lessee’s obligation to pay damages subsequent to the re-letting?

Fact Summary. Defendant Homeland, leased office space from Schlesinger, lessor. Homeland abandoned the property prior to the expiration on the lease and the premises were subsequently re-let to another tenant for a higher rent and longer term, who also defaulted.

Held. No to a. and No to b. Reversed and remanded, judgment for lessor of $26,460.
Following abandonment of the leased premises a landlord cannot stand idly by and look to the tenant for damages in the remainder of the lease term. Thus, the landlord has a duty to mitigate damages by seeking a suitable tenant to re-let the premises. When the tenant abandons the leased property the tenant surrenders his estate in the property, but is still liable for damages from the breach of contract.
The tenant who breached remains liable for the difference between the agreed price of the rent and the fair rental value of the premises, which is an amount the law presumes the lessor can obtain with reasonable efforts to re-let the premises.
The mere act of re-letting for a longer or shorter term does not, without more, bar the lessor’s claim for damages from the breach. The lessor is not required to mitigate damages by re-letting the premises at less than the fair rental value.
Evidence of the lessor’s reasonable efforts to re-let the premises in question are found when lessor stated that at all times he tried to re-let the property, and that there was a surplus of office space in the Portland area during the relevant portion of time. Because the re-letting did not cancel the original lease, the receiver for Homeland is liable for $26,460, which is the amount for the rent remaining in the original term during which time the building was vacant.
Edwards v. Habib
Rule of Law. That proof of retaliatory motive does constitute a defense to any action for eviction.
Fact Summary. A tenant reported sanitary code violations on leased premises and thereafter the landlord moved to evict the tenant.

Held. No. Reversed and remanded.
The promulgation of the housing code by the District of Columbia Commissioners under authority from Congress implies a change in the relative rights as between landlords and tenants.
Proof of retaliatory motive is a defense to any action of eviction where the alleged retaliation occurs due to the tenant’s reporting of housing code violations.
Edwards challenged the constitutionality of the statute under which the landlord may elect to terminate a month to month tenancy upon a thirty day notice to quit, where judicial enforcement of such statute would render state aid to the landlord in depriving tenant of a property right, namely, the tenant’s right to report housing code violations. The Court found that this issue need not be decided. Instead, the Court would allow the tenant to present proof in an eviction proceeding of a retaliatory motive by landlord in the instituting of the eviction suit.
Because the Court has a duty, as a court of equity, to consider the social implications of its decisions, the Court found that the public policy of protecting tenants in slum housing from inequalities resulting from their social conditions must be considered in rendering this decision.
The Court found that the balance between the statutes authorizing the landlord to evict a month to month tenant after thirty days notice and the housing code statutes can only be struck by holding the eviction statutes inapplicable where the court’s aid is sought to effect an eviction in retaliation for reporting housing code violations.

Issue. Does the landlord have an absolute right under these circumstances to terminate the month to month tenancy and evict the tenant?

Fact Summary. A tenant reported sanitary code violations on leased premises and thereafter the landlord moved to evict the tenant.
Walls v. Oxford Management Co
Rule of Law. Absent exceptional circumstances, a landlord does not have a duty to protect tenants from criminal attacks by third persons. The implied warranty of habitability does not apply to impose any additional duties on landlords in the circumstance of criminal attacks on tenants by third persons.
Issue. There are two issues:
Does the landlord have a duty to secure tenants against criminal attack?
Is the implied warranty of habitability breached by criminal acts of third persons?

Facts. On December 5, 1988, Plaintiff Deanna Walls was sexually assaulted in her vehicle parked on the premises of Bay Ridge Apartment Complex. The Defendants in this case are the owners of the apartment complex and the management of the complex. During the two years prior to the assault on Plaintiff there were eleven auto thefts, three attempted auto thefts, and thirty-one incidents of criminal mischief/ theft. No sexual assaults were reported. Plaintiff brought an action in federal court alleging that Defendants had a duty to hire competent management, provide reasonable security, a duty to warn residents of lack of security, and a duty to warn residents of the numerous criminal activities which had occurred. The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants breached the duties listed and that such breach was the proximate cause of her injuries.

No to a. and No to b. Remanded.
Landlords owe a general duty of reasonable care to their tenants, but the common law does not impose a duty on private citizens to protect others from criminal attacks by third parties. Thus, the Court will not place such a duty on landlords, unless the conduct of the parties merits a finding that one of the exceptions to the general rule is implicated.
The exceptions of the general rule against holding private citizens liable from attacks by third parties fall into four categories: 1. When a special relationship, such as innkeeper-guest or carrier-passenger, exists. This type of relationship is not present in a landlord-tenant relationship. 2. When a condition brought about by the defendant is a special temptation to foreseeable criminal conduct. This is how most cases holding landlords liable are decided. 3. When there is an overriding foreseeability of criminal attack. This is not adopted here. 4. Under the general tort principle that one who assumes a duty thereafter must act with reasonable care.
The Court held that while landlords have no general duty to protect tenants from criminal attack, such a duty may arise when the landlord has created or is responsible for a known defective condition on the premises which creates a foreseeable risk of criminal conduct. A landlord who undertakes, gratuitously or under contract, to provide security for an apartment complex must act thereafter with reasonable care. Unless the conduct of the landlord fits into one of those exceptions, the landlord will not be held liable for criminal attack on residents by third persons.
The implied warranty of habitability in residential lease agreements protects tenants against structural defects, but does not require landlords to take affirmative measures to provide security against criminal attack. This does not limit a recovery should the landlord violate an express covenant in the lease or through an attack through a violation of the housing code.
Burns v. McCormick
Rule of Law. Acts of part performance will not make an oral agreement affecting the rights in land enforceable unless the part performance was unequivocally referable to the alleged contract.
Issue. Will an act of part performance be sufficient to enforce an oral agreement affecting rights in land?

Facts. James Halsey (Halsey) was old man living alone. He told a couple (Plaintiffs) that if they gave up their home and business, lived with him, and cared for him during his life, the house and other property would be theirs when he died. They did as he asked, and he died five months after they moved in. No writing exists to authenticate this promise. Plaintiffs requested specific performance, and the estate defended with the statute of frauds.

Held. No.
Not every act of part performance will move an equity court to enforce an oral agreement affecting rights in land. The part performance must be unequivocally referable to the alleged contract.
When Plaintiffs lived with Halsey, they admit to not occupying the land as owners or under claim of present right. They did not have possession. They lived with him as guest, and he could have asked them to leave at any time. Their rights were executory and in the future. Their title, then, cannot be found in possession or dominion. Plaintiffs’ care of Halsey might have stemmed from the hope that their service would ensure an indefinite reward sometime in the future. This is especially true since one of them was distantly related to Halsey.
The acts of part performance are not solely and unequivocally referable to a contract for the sale of land, even though Plaintiffs did lose some money in moving in with Halsey. Plaintiffs may be able to recover for the value of the board and services, but this loss still does not dispense with the requirement that there was no act of promise.
Centex Homes Corp. v. Boag
Rule of Law. The remedy of specific performance should no longer (in this jurisdiction) be automatically available to a vendor of real estate, but should be confined to those special instances where a vendor will otherwise suffer an economic injury for which his damage remedy at law will not be adequate, or where other equitable considerations require that the relief be granted.
Issue. Does the equitable remedy of specific performance lie for the enforcement of a contract for the sale of a condominium apartment?

Fact Summary. On September 13, 1972, Defendants Mr. & Mrs. Eugene Boag decided to purchase a condominium from Plaintiff Centex Homes Corp. for $73,700, by first paying a deposit of $525 and by then tendering a check for the down payment of $6,870. Then, on September 27, 1972, Boag, upon learning he was to be transferred to Chicago, wrote and advised Centex that he “would be unable to complete the purchase” agreement and stopped payment on the check for $6,870. Centex deposited the check for collection approximately two weeks after the letter from the Defendant Boag, but the check was not honored.

Held. No. Centex’s complaint in specific performance is denied. Under the provisions of Centex’s purchase agreement regarding liquidated damages for breach, the amount is limited to such monies paid by the Boags at the time of the breach, or $525.
Under the condominium housing scheme the units which are sold are considered real estate, and the purchaser receives a deed which is then recorded. The only difference between condominiums and other realty is that the owner of a condominium also owns an undivided interest in common areas. Centex argues that because the subject matter is real estate, then the equitable remedy of specific performance should be available.
The Court found that the history of the doctrine of specific performance in real estate transactions is that the vendee of land may sue in specific performance due to the uniqueness of land and the inadequacy of damages at law, and that the vendor may sue in specific performance based on a concept of mutuality of remedies. The mutuality of remedies means that the remedy of specific performance would not lie unless the remedy was available to vendor and vendee.
This Court questions the rationale of allowing vendors of real estate to sue in specific performance, because the vendor’s remedy in an action at law for damages is sufficient. This Court found that the proper test to determine mutuality of remedy is whether the obligations of the contract are mutual and not whether each is entitled to the same remedy in case of the breach. The Court noted that the trend was toward the disappearance of the mutuality of remedies doctrine.
The Court concluded that the remedy of specific performance should no longer be automatically available to a vendor of real estate, but should be confined to those cases where the remedy in damages will not be adequate to compensate the vendor, or when other equitable considerations are present. The Court found that the condominium unit at issue in this case was not special nor unique and that hundreds of identical units were being offered for sale by the vendor. The Court noted that, despite the condominium unit’s label of realty, the units shared the same characteristics as personal property. Therefore, the damages at law are sufficient and specific performance will not lie.
The damages at law, or liquidated damages in this case, under the purchase agreement, consisted of all monies paid by the Defendant Boag at the time of the breach, which was the deposit of $525.
French v. French
Rule of Law. Under the statute of uses, 27 Hen. VIII. Cap.10, “where any person stands seised of any lands to the use of any other person by reason of bargain, sale or feoffment, such person that have any such use shall be deemed and adjudged in lawful seisen, estate and possession thereof, to all intents and purposes.”
Issue. There are two issued presented:
Was the purported conveyance in this case defective under the statute requiring a conveyance to be attested by two persons?
Is every deed, which does not comply with the statutory requirements, wholly inoperative?

Fact Summary. A conveyance from son (Plaintiff) to father (Defendant) of a life estate in favor of the Defendant was challenged as being statutorily insufficient as being attested by only one witness when the statute required two witnesses.

Held. No. Judgment for the Defendant.
Under the statute of uses, 27 Hen. VIII. Cap.10, “where any person stands seised of any lands to the use of any other person by reason of bargain, sale or feoffment, such person that have any such use shall be deemed and adjudged in lawful seisen, estate and possession thereof, to all intents and purposes.”
The bargainer contracts to sell the land, and receives the purchase money; after this, he is, in equity, considered as seised in the land to the use of the bargainee; and this statute unites the possession to the use, so that the very instant the use is raised, the possession is joined to it, and the bargainee becomes seised of the land. There must be pecuniary consideration, which does not necessarily mean monetary consideration. If a man covenants to stand seised to the use of another person, a use is thereby raised, which the statute will execute.
In this case, the Defendant first gave a deed to the son and then the son gave a conveyance of a life estate back to the father, and the latter conveyance is at issue. The statute of uses is applied to raise a use in favor of the father, which is an equitable theory not resting on the formalities of the deed.
Another form of use is a covenant to stand seised. This is only applicable to uses arising from blood or marriage. If a man covenant to stand seised to the use of his wife, son or cousin, without saying in consideration of natural love, the covenant will raise the use, and the statute will execute it.
The statute regarding the deed formalities applies to “bargains and sales, and other conveyances.” Thus, the statute of uses is still operational, and has not been specifically overruled by the statute. In this case the contract of the grantor was made in consideration of blood and that grant was sufficient to raise a use, which is executed by the statute of uses.
Grayson v. Holloway
Rule of Law. The court found that the lower court had a duty to construe the deed by giving effect to all its parts and thus determine the true intent of the grantors.
Did the deed convey fee simple to both G.P. Holloway and his wife, Defendant as tenants by the entirety?

Fact Summary. There was a conflict between clauses in a deed when the granting clause of the deed listed the only grantee as the husband, and the “habendum” clause named grantees to be husband and wife, their heirs and assigns forever, which would have created a tenancy by the entirety.

Held. Yes. The facts showed a joint undertaking by Defendant and her husband.
The lower court gave no consideration to the intent of the parties.
The court found that the lower court had a duty to construe the deed by giving effect to all its parts and thus determine the true intent of the grantors.
The court found that the deed vested in G.P. Holloway and wife, Defendant Mae Holloway, an estate as tenants by the entireties because the grantors contemplated that both of the grantees would render personal service.
The court found that it would be unusual for the grantors to contemplate that their son alone could perform all the necessary tasks to take care of them.
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Kelton
Rule of Law. The court cited the Pennsylvania case of Maul v. Rider, 59 Pa. 167, which held that, “It is sometimes said that the record of a deed is constructive notice to all the world. That, it is evident, is too broad and unqualified an enunciation of the doctrine. It is constructive notice only to those who are bound to search for it.”
Issue. Was the contractor under constructive notice of the easement on the land in favor of Plaintiff?

Fact Summary. A telephone company brought an action against property owners and a contractor (Kelton) for damage to an underground cable laid across land under a perpetual easement, which had been duly recorded. The property owners were found negligent in failing to take proper precautions.

Held. No. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
The Plaintiff telephone company argued that the Defendant contractor should be held liable for the reason that Defendant entered upon the property of Plaintiff with heavy digging equipment and made no inquiry as to what might lay below the surface of the premises, even though the easement was a matter of record.
The Court cited the Pennsylvania case of Maul v. Rider, 59 Pa. 167, which held that, “It is sometimes said that the record of a deed is constructive notice to all the world. That, it is evident, is too broad and unqualified an enunciation of the doctrine. It is constructive notice only to those who are bound to search for it.” [emphasis added in original].
Applying the rule to the case at bar, the Court found that the Defendant contractor was under no obligation to actively search the deed to the property, and that the Defendant contractor had no interest in the title to the land.
Because Defendant contractor was not charged with notice of Plaintiff’s easement, the doctrine of constructive notice will not be applied to Defendant contractor.
Earle v. Fiske
Rule of Law. Although an unrecorded deed is binding upon the grantor, his heirs and devisees, and also upon all persons having actual notice of it, it is not valid and effectual as against any other persons. As to all such other persons, the unrecorded deed is a mere nullity.
Issue. Did the lack of recordation of the deed in favor of Defendants from Nancy Fiske mean that the subsequent deed from Nancy’s sole heir, Benjamin, to Plaintiff conveyed good title?

Fact Summary. Nancy Fiske owned land, which she conveyed to her son, Benjamin, and his wife, Elizabeth Fiske by deed dated April 22, 1864, but not recorded until 1867. The deed reserved a life estate in Benjamin and Elizabeth, and a remainder in fee to Mary Fiske.

Held. Yes. Judgment reversed, new trial ordered.
A deed duly signed, sealed and delivered is sufficient, as between the original parties to it, to transfer the whole title of the grantor to the grantee, though the instrument may not have been acknowledged or recorded. The title passes by the deed, and not by the registration.
However, when the effect of the deed upon the rights of third persons, such as creditors or bona fide purchasers, is to be considered, the law requires more, namely, either actual notice, or the further formality of registration, which is constructive notice.
Although an unrecorded deed is binding upon the grantor, his heirs and devisees, and also upon all persons having actual notice of it, it is not valid and effectual as against any other persons. As to all such other persons, the unrecorded deed is a mere nullity.
The manifest purpose of the recording statute is, that the apparent owner of record shall be considered as the true owner, so far as subsequent purchasers without notice to the contrary are concerned, notwithstanding any unrecorded and unknown previous alienation.
Eastwood v. Shedd
Rule of Law. The Colorado act required all deeds to be recorded and provided that no deed should have any effect, except between parties, until the deed was recorded. This protection is against all classes of persons with any rights claimed.
Issue. The Court stated the issue as, “Is the donee of real property, who has duly recorded the instrument of conveyance, entitled to the protection of the provisions of C.R.S. 1963, 118-6-9, of the Colorado Conveyancing and Recording Act?”

Fact Summary. In this case, Cleo Alexander (Alexander) on December 2, 1958, made a gift of property to the Defendant, Shedd (Defendant), who did not record the deed until October 16, 1964. On October 15, 1963, Alexander gift deeded the same property to the Plaintiff, Eastwood (Plaintiff), who recorded her deed on October 23, 1963. The Plaintiff had no actual nor constructive knowledge of the deed to the Defendant until the deed to the Defendant was recorded a year after the Plaintiff recorded her deed. The Plaintiff brought suit against the Defendant to quiet title to the property and was successful at the trial court level, from which decree the Defendant appealed.

Held. Yes. Judgment affirmed.
The Colorado act required all deeds to be recorded and provided that no deed should have any effect, except between parties, until the deed was recorded. This protection is against all classes of persons with any rights claimed.
The Defendant pointed out that 39 states have recording acts, which protect only bona fide purchasers for value and without notice. In other words, in those states, an unrecorded deed is invalid only against the claims of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.
The trial court found, and this Court agreed, that Colorado has a “race-notice statute,” which gives priority to a second grantee only if he takes the instrument without notice of the prior conveyance and gets his instrument recorded ahead of the prior instrument. Thus, the Plaintiff (the second grantee) who took her deed without notice of the prior conveyance and then recorded ahead of the prior deed, was entitled to the protection of the recording statute.
The Colorado statute is one of a kind with regard to its protection of “any class of persons with any kind of rights” and the fact that the legislature worded the statute in that manner is to be given legal effect.
Petersen v. Hubschman Construction Co., Inc
Rule of Law. In the sale of a new house by a builder-vendor there is an implied warranty of habitability, which will support an action against the builder-vendor by the vendee for latent defects and which will avoid the unjust results of caveat emptor and the merger rule.
Issue. May the builder raise the non-breach of the implied warranty of habitability to enforce the forfeiture, insofar as the home was livable, though not well-made?

Fact Summary. In April 1972, the Plaintiffs Raymond Peterson (Mr. Peterson) and Delores Petersen (Plaintiffs), entered into a contract for $71,000 with the Defendant, Hubschman Construction (Defendant), for the purchase of a piece of land and to have a home constructed thereupon. The Plaintiffs paid $10,000 in earnest money and there was an offset of $9,000 for work done by Mr. Petersen. The Plaintiffs became dissatisfied with the Defendant’s performance and the Defendant agreed to repair numerous problems on a “punch list,” but failed to satisfactorily carry out the agreement.

Held. No. Judgment affirmed.
The implied warranty of habitability in cases involving the sale of new homes by a builder-vendor is a judicial innovation of rather recent origin used to avoid the harshness of caveat emptor and the doctrine of merger and to afford a degree of relief to vendees of new homes who subsequently discover latent defects in the structure. In the old rule of buyer beware, the vendee took the title to the property at his own risk. Under merger, all the agreements between the vendor and vendee were said to have merged in the deed, which would prevent recovery by a vendee.
In the sale of a new house by a builder-vendor there is an implied warranty of habitability, which will support an action against the builder-vendor by the vendee for latent defects and which will avoid the unjust results of caveat emptor and the merger rule.
The implied warranty of habitability does not arise as a result of the execution of the deed. It arises by virtue of the execution of the agreement between the vendor and vendee. The implied warranty exists as an independent undertaking collateral to the covenant to convey.
The mere fact that the house is capable of being inhabited does not satisfy the implied warranty. The Court analogized the implied warranty of habitability to the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) provisions concerning the warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. [U.C.C. 2-314, 2-315].
Because the land and the house belonged to the Defendant, the Defendant could re-sell the house and land and recover losses sustained by the Plaintiffs’ non-performance. The Plaintiffs were allowed to repudiate the contract on the basis of the implied warranty of habitability.
Leach v. Gunnarson
Rule of Law. The grantee is entitled to protection by warranty against encumbrances existing at the time of conveyance, even though the grantee, as here, knew about the encumbrance at the time of conveyance.
Issue. Does the neighbors’ use of the spring constitute an encumbrance on the Plaintiffs’ title, which the Defendants are obligated to defend against?

Fact Summary. In this case, the Plaintiffs’ neighbors have an irrevocable license to use a spring that is on the Plaintiffs’ land. The Plaintiffs’ predecessor in title granted the irrevocable license to the neighbors. The Plaintiffs have sued their predecessors in title, the Defendants, who granted the neighbors the irrevocable license to use the spring by oral agreement when the Defendants owned the property.

Held. Yes. Reversed and remanded.
An encumbrance generally means “any right to or interest in the land, subsisting in a third person, to the diminution of the value of the land, though consistent with the passing of the fee by conveyance.”
The Court found that its prior decisions held that the grantee is entitled to protection by warranty against encumbrances existing at the time of conveyance, even though the grantee, as here, knew about the encumbrance at the time of conveyance.
The Court noted that some jurisdictions have held that a different rule applied to encumbrances that affect the physical condition of the real property and that are open, notorious and visible.
The Court cited its prior decisions which considered encumbrances that were open, notorious, and visible, which causes such encumbrances to be exceptions to the general rule stated in subsection (b) above. The Court found that this case was not of the same type as the prior cases where exceptions were made for known easements for public highways, powerlines, railroads and the like. An irrevocable license to use a spring was not so physically permanent to come within the narrow exception to the rule stated in subsection (b) above.
Kasten Construction Co. v. Maple Ridge Construction Co
Rule of Law. In a case involving specific performance, when the intention of the parties is always the controlling factor, the general rule is that time is not of the essence of the contract of sale and purchase of land unless a contrary purpose is disclosed by its terms or is indicated by the circumstances and object of its execution and the conduct of the parties.
Issue. Is the Plaintiff entitled to specific performance of the contract?

Fact Summary. Maple Ridge Construction Co. (Plaintiff) was to buy thirty-four “finished” lots from Kasten Construction Co. (Defendant). The Defendant did not perform within the time allowed and the Plaintiff sued to enforce specific performance.

Held. Yes. Judgment of chancellor in decreeing specific performance affirmed.
In a case involving specific performance, when the intention of the parties is always the controlling factor, the general rule is that time is not of the essence of the contract of sale and purchase of land unless a contrary purpose is disclosed by its terms or is indicated by the circumstances and object of its execution and the conduct of the parties.
Because the contract here did not specify that time was of the essence, the chancellor was correct in ordering specific performance.
The general rule is that even when a contract for the sale of land specifies a date for consummation, equity treats the provision as formal rather than essential. It also permits the purchaser to make payments after the prescribed date and to compel performance by the seller, unless it appears that time is of the essence by the words of the contract.
Because the chancellor found that the delay in this case was reasonable, the chancellor’s ruling of specific performance in favor of the Plaintiff is affirmed.