Peter Morath
12/22/2017
Philosophy of Mind 330
Prof. Jon Stoltz
In Defense of Disjunctivist Theories of Mind
Confronting Naïve Realism
Most philosophers agree that some forms of hallucination might not be subjectively distinguishable from proper perception. This agreement, however, does not bring unity to ideas of perception. The intentionalist claims that because these two experiences cannot be subjectively distinguished, then they must be experiences of the same kind. The disjunctivist, however, claims that even though perceptions and hallucinations, in extreme cases, are not subjectively distinguishable, they must nonetheless be fundamentally different experiences. Disjunctivism’s attack on intentionalist representationalism is touted …show more content…
The event is either hallucination or genuine perception—they cannot be the same in kind. This view is attractive because it follows closely to a naïve, or direct, theory of perception. This direct approach to perception is how we usually talk about perception. When we say “Look at this” we don’t mean “Look at my mental representation.” Disjunctivism tries to reconcile this simplicity within a unified philosophy of …show more content…
The article “Illusions of Sense” provides a perspective on a realist theory that focuses on the distinction between real perception and belief. His main point in the article is that a realist idea of perception is justifiable because, he claims, hallucination can be explained in terms of two separate, but linked, false beliefs. He is not, however, saying that hallucination is simply a false belief: “False belief is altogether too mild a description.” He instead focuses on a dual belief system that hallucination in order to explain the “thingness” of hallucination. This is primarily 1) that I think there is something and 2) that I am now seeing that something. These two beliefs, when false in the case of hallucination, are enough, according to Armstrong, to account for the minds distinction from direct perception. For if it is possible to bring about a degree of false belief at will, why should it not be possible for the unconscious mind to bring about these hallucinations like in the case of certain unwanted thoughts? These beliefs are different in kind to perception and only deceive us through false belief – not direct
12/22/2017
Philosophy of Mind 330
Prof. Jon Stoltz
In Defense of Disjunctivist Theories of Mind
Confronting Naïve Realism
Most philosophers agree that some forms of hallucination might not be subjectively distinguishable from proper perception. This agreement, however, does not bring unity to ideas of perception. The intentionalist claims that because these two experiences cannot be subjectively distinguished, then they must be experiences of the same kind. The disjunctivist, however, claims that even though perceptions and hallucinations, in extreme cases, are not subjectively distinguishable, they must nonetheless be fundamentally different experiences. Disjunctivism’s attack on intentionalist representationalism is touted …show more content…
The event is either hallucination or genuine perception—they cannot be the same in kind. This view is attractive because it follows closely to a naïve, or direct, theory of perception. This direct approach to perception is how we usually talk about perception. When we say “Look at this” we don’t mean “Look at my mental representation.” Disjunctivism tries to reconcile this simplicity within a unified philosophy of …show more content…
The article “Illusions of Sense” provides a perspective on a realist theory that focuses on the distinction between real perception and belief. His main point in the article is that a realist idea of perception is justifiable because, he claims, hallucination can be explained in terms of two separate, but linked, false beliefs. He is not, however, saying that hallucination is simply a false belief: “False belief is altogether too mild a description.” He instead focuses on a dual belief system that hallucination in order to explain the “thingness” of hallucination. This is primarily 1) that I think there is something and 2) that I am now seeing that something. These two beliefs, when false in the case of hallucination, are enough, according to Armstrong, to account for the minds distinction from direct perception. For if it is possible to bring about a degree of false belief at will, why should it not be possible for the unconscious mind to bring about these hallucinations like in the case of certain unwanted thoughts? These beliefs are different in kind to perception and only deceive us through false belief – not direct