The purpose of this paper is to identify how the British Admiralty’s COMINT failures during the Battle of Jutland prevented them from destroying the German High Seas Fleet. The battle is re-imagined with a much better-trained and coordinated intelligence section.
The British Admiralty’s intelligence failures prevented Admiral Sir John Jellicoe’s Grand Fleet from winning a decisive victory against Scheer’s High Seas Fleet. Because the Admiralty’s COMINT section did not maintain control over their information and failed to confirm key intelligence reports, Jellicoe lost confidence in the Admiralty as a source of intelligence. Because the Admiralty failed to forward a key intelligence report which would have confirmed Scheer’s route back to port, Jellicoe was unable to prevent the High Seas Fleet from returning to safety. …show more content…
Jellicoe then changed his plan from trying to lure out Scheer to finding and destroying him in the open ocean. Jellicoe ordered his entire fleet to sea, instead of the smaller contingent he had originally planned. The main British fleet left Scapa Flow at 21:30 on 30 May, 1916 with 24 dreadnoughts, three battle cruisers, eight armored cruisers, 11 light cruisers, and 53 destroyers. Admiral Sir David Beatty’s Battle Cruiser Force left Rosyth at 22:15 with four new super-dreadnoughts, six battle cruisers, 14 light cruisers, and 27 destroyers. The two elements steamed for an area southwest of the Norwegian coast. (Stokesbury, 1981)
Admiral Franz von Hipper’s Scouting Force steamed from the Jade shortly before dawn on 31 May with five battle cruisers, five light cruisers, and 30 destroyers. After Hipper had steamed about 50 miles, Admiral Reinhard Scheer’s main body followed with 16 dreadnoughts, six pre-dreadnought battleships, six light cruisers, and 31 destroyers. The fleet was to pass approximately 50 miles off the Danish Peninsula. (Stokesbury,
The British Admiralty’s intelligence failures prevented Admiral Sir John Jellicoe’s Grand Fleet from winning a decisive victory against Scheer’s High Seas Fleet. Because the Admiralty’s COMINT section did not maintain control over their information and failed to confirm key intelligence reports, Jellicoe lost confidence in the Admiralty as a source of intelligence. Because the Admiralty failed to forward a key intelligence report which would have confirmed Scheer’s route back to port, Jellicoe was unable to prevent the High Seas Fleet from returning to safety. …show more content…
Jellicoe then changed his plan from trying to lure out Scheer to finding and destroying him in the open ocean. Jellicoe ordered his entire fleet to sea, instead of the smaller contingent he had originally planned. The main British fleet left Scapa Flow at 21:30 on 30 May, 1916 with 24 dreadnoughts, three battle cruisers, eight armored cruisers, 11 light cruisers, and 53 destroyers. Admiral Sir David Beatty’s Battle Cruiser Force left Rosyth at 22:15 with four new super-dreadnoughts, six battle cruisers, 14 light cruisers, and 27 destroyers. The two elements steamed for an area southwest of the Norwegian coast. (Stokesbury, 1981)
Admiral Franz von Hipper’s Scouting Force steamed from the Jade shortly before dawn on 31 May with five battle cruisers, five light cruisers, and 30 destroyers. After Hipper had steamed about 50 miles, Admiral Reinhard Scheer’s main body followed with 16 dreadnoughts, six pre-dreadnought battleships, six light cruisers, and 31 destroyers. The fleet was to pass approximately 50 miles off the Danish Peninsula. (Stokesbury,