It has been widely argued that minorities’ rights and dignity are well protected in western liberal countries up to a level humanly possible. Majority rule should be limited by the requirement that minority rights may not be violated. Will Kymlicka draws our attention by arguing that it is exactly not the case. In fact, classical liberalist conception of liberty, equality and neutrality posed three serious issues pertinent to the minority rights; (i) Liberalism focuses on individuals, thus ignoring group identities and the values individual obtain from them; (ii) Liberal ideal of equal citizenship undermines the ability of groups to determine themselves and to preserve what …show more content…
The first two sections are expository. In section 1, I will discuss three widely accepted features of liberalism, liberty, equality, neutrality. In the following section, I will explore Kymlicka’s arguments with an emphasis on liberalism. Based on these sections, my final section will be focused on the evaluation whether Kymlicka’s arguments are justified or not.
I
Liberalism is one of the predominant forms of democratic governments that has widely chosen around the globe because of its core features; liberty, equality, neutrality, fraternity, and toleration. It has sometimes been defined as the belief that the freedom of the individual is the highest political value, and that institutions and practices are to be judged by their success in promoting it. The definition of the word ‘liberty’ in Liberalism owed to two British philosophers, Lock and Mill, for its wide currency beyond its negative connotation. Hence, we can distinguish between two types of liberty, negative and positive. Locke, one of the founders of classical liberalism, believes that individuals are naturally free, subject only to the law of nature. The natural right to liberty is a right not to …show more content…
His given definition of this term runs as follows “the view that the state should not reward or penalize particular conceptions of the good life but, rather, should provide a neutral framework within which different and potentially conflicting conceptions of the good can be pursued”. This means, he says, that the state must not justify its policies on the basis of the intrinsic superiority or inferiority of particular conceptions of the good life and it must not attempt to influence people’s judgments of the value of these different