This problem Merleau-Ponty has with Descartes' notion of intellectual judgement stems from a general problem with Descartes' subject/object dichotomy and representational theory of mind. Perception, for Descartes, is a mental representation of external, extended, mechanistic bodies.16 Only on the basis of the reflective Cogito can the mental representations accurately grasp the truth of that which is "beyond experience". There are the initial "subjective" This ontological dualism is precisely the problem that Merleau-Ponty has with Cartesianism: there is an uncritical presupposition of "true" that is beyond illusion and which appearances connect to in some manner.17 However this notion of truth in perception necessitates a context: the evident,
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What is this vague notion of "intellectual judgement" that makes this possible? How can we even account for "qualia" on the basis of a theory that reduces subjective experience to sense-data? the most damning problem with this theory is that it is uncritically accepted and merely taken as basic. A pure impression, outside of a context is not only undiscoverable but imperceptible and therefore inconceivable.22 The Cartesian atomistic account of perception misses the very thing that it sets out to …show more content…
The main problem with Gestalt psychology is that it assumes that the relation between figure and background is fixed, when the background is constituted by our corporeal schema. What makes the figure and background so significant for us is the movement of our bodies around said background: the movement of our head or eyes, or body in general around the background. The problem with Gestalt psychology is that ends up as a descriptive, second-order reflection precisely be assuming the fixedness of the background, reifies the background and is thus not a proper account of lived experience. Only by accounting for the movement of the body within the background can we truly account for a phenomenological analysis of perception.
The result of this phenomenological analysis of perception is ultimately an unclear relationship.To exemplify this, Merleau-Ponty elaborates on the meaning of the term être tout miel: to feign an amicable disposition when holding secret negative emotions and feelings. This epithet can only be understood as meaningful on the basis of the body's relationship with the external object of honey itself. When we try to grasp and possess the sweet, liquid finds themselves grasped by it in turn as it slowly moves between our fingers; the honey sticks.26 The person who's the object of our gaze keeps their mastery
What is this vague notion of "intellectual judgement" that makes this possible? How can we even account for "qualia" on the basis of a theory that reduces subjective experience to sense-data? the most damning problem with this theory is that it is uncritically accepted and merely taken as basic. A pure impression, outside of a context is not only undiscoverable but imperceptible and therefore inconceivable.22 The Cartesian atomistic account of perception misses the very thing that it sets out to …show more content…
The main problem with Gestalt psychology is that it assumes that the relation between figure and background is fixed, when the background is constituted by our corporeal schema. What makes the figure and background so significant for us is the movement of our bodies around said background: the movement of our head or eyes, or body in general around the background. The problem with Gestalt psychology is that ends up as a descriptive, second-order reflection precisely be assuming the fixedness of the background, reifies the background and is thus not a proper account of lived experience. Only by accounting for the movement of the body within the background can we truly account for a phenomenological analysis of perception.
The result of this phenomenological analysis of perception is ultimately an unclear relationship.To exemplify this, Merleau-Ponty elaborates on the meaning of the term être tout miel: to feign an amicable disposition when holding secret negative emotions and feelings. This epithet can only be understood as meaningful on the basis of the body's relationship with the external object of honey itself. When we try to grasp and possess the sweet, liquid finds themselves grasped by it in turn as it slowly moves between our fingers; the honey sticks.26 The person who's the object of our gaze keeps their mastery