John Searle argues in his article “Minds, Brains, and Computers,” that computationalism is a false logic that fails to explain the mind. In doing so, Searle distinguishes between two modes of artificial intelligence(AI)—the strong and weak AI. Searle acknowledges that the weak AI hypothesis, which claims that digital computers are merely powerful tools, could potentially be correct. However, Searle objects the strong AI hypothesis because it claims that appropriately programmed computer is not simply a powerful tool but rather a mind that can be said to understand and have cognitive states. To illustrate the flaws in computationalism, Searle devises the thought experiment called the Chinese Room. The thought experiment begins with a monolingual
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The argument is invalid and unsound because it implies the mind can be everywhere. For example, if my hand senses pain by processing that information, there is nothing to prevent me from claiming that the hand is a mind. Overall the argument is invalid because it claims that the conjugation of a person (who does not understand Chinese) and piece of paper could understand Chinese. The room by itself cannot understand Chinese and since Sam doesn’t understand Chinese, it is clear the whole system doesn’t. To simplify, Sam being a part of the system fails to understand Chinese, then nothing Sam is a part of will understand Chinese. In addition, Sam is capable of become the system itself by memorizing the entire program. The memorization would only improve efficiency of syntax processing and would contribute nothing to Sam’s understanding of Chinese. Therefore, the claim that the whole system can understand Chinese can be refuted because the argument is invalid. In response to Searle’ argument, I have shown that premise (1) and premise (2) of the Chinese Room argument are both sound and valid. I have defended Searle’s claim against computationalism. I grant the point, that strong AI hypothesis fails to address the mind because critics fail to understand what a digital computer is. Digital computers fail to produce meaning and any operation that is purely syntax is insufficient. In conclusion, cognitive mechanisms cannot be explained by computationalism—a false
The argument is invalid and unsound because it implies the mind can be everywhere. For example, if my hand senses pain by processing that information, there is nothing to prevent me from claiming that the hand is a mind. Overall the argument is invalid because it claims that the conjugation of a person (who does not understand Chinese) and piece of paper could understand Chinese. The room by itself cannot understand Chinese and since Sam doesn’t understand Chinese, it is clear the whole system doesn’t. To simplify, Sam being a part of the system fails to understand Chinese, then nothing Sam is a part of will understand Chinese. In addition, Sam is capable of become the system itself by memorizing the entire program. The memorization would only improve efficiency of syntax processing and would contribute nothing to Sam’s understanding of Chinese. Therefore, the claim that the whole system can understand Chinese can be refuted because the argument is invalid. In response to Searle’ argument, I have shown that premise (1) and premise (2) of the Chinese Room argument are both sound and valid. I have defended Searle’s claim against computationalism. I grant the point, that strong AI hypothesis fails to address the mind because critics fail to understand what a digital computer is. Digital computers fail to produce meaning and any operation that is purely syntax is insufficient. In conclusion, cognitive mechanisms cannot be explained by computationalism—a false