Neser first contends that the Board erred in looking beyond the text of the HCGPP to glean the intent of the provision involving call-in pay. Neser argues that the text is unambiguous, and as such the Board was unjustified in looking to extrinsic sources to discern the HCGPP’s meaning. We disagree. “‘The first step in determining legislative intent is to look at the statutory language and if the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous. . . .’” Johnson v. Mayor & City Council of Balt. City, 387 Md. 1, 11 (2005) (quoting Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35 (1995)). “If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute’s provisions and our analysis ends.” Moore v. State, 424 Md. 118, 127-28 (2011). An ambiguity exists “[w]hen the
…show more content…
An ambiguity may be semantic, syntatic, or contextual. Reed Dickerson, The Diseases of Legislative Language, 1 Harv. J. Legis. 7-8 (1964). Notably, these forms of ambiguity involve some text that may be afforded multiple yet finite constructions. See e.g., Id. at 8, 8 n.9 (“The trustee shall require him promptly to repay the loan” is an example of a syntatic ambiguity. “Does ‘promptly’ modify ‘require’ or ‘repay’?”); Singer, supra, at 15 (Explaining that a semantic ambiguity might exist in the word “bill.” “[T]he word ‘bill’ may refer to an evidence of indebtedness, to currency, to a petition, to a person’s name, to the anatomy of a bird, a portion of a cap and a host of other objects . . .”). Accordingly, in a narrow sense of the word, ambiguity is sometimes said to be but one specific form of indeterminacy that can be found throughout language. Lawrence M. Solan, Pernicious Ambiguity In Contracts and Statutes, 79 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 859, 860 (2004) (“When discussing indeterminacy in meaning, linguists and philosophers often distinguish between ambiguity and
An ambiguity may be semantic, syntatic, or contextual. Reed Dickerson, The Diseases of Legislative Language, 1 Harv. J. Legis. 7-8 (1964). Notably, these forms of ambiguity involve some text that may be afforded multiple yet finite constructions. See e.g., Id. at 8, 8 n.9 (“The trustee shall require him promptly to repay the loan” is an example of a syntatic ambiguity. “Does ‘promptly’ modify ‘require’ or ‘repay’?”); Singer, supra, at 15 (Explaining that a semantic ambiguity might exist in the word “bill.” “[T]he word ‘bill’ may refer to an evidence of indebtedness, to currency, to a petition, to a person’s name, to the anatomy of a bird, a portion of a cap and a host of other objects . . .”). Accordingly, in a narrow sense of the word, ambiguity is sometimes said to be but one specific form of indeterminacy that can be found throughout language. Lawrence M. Solan, Pernicious Ambiguity In Contracts and Statutes, 79 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 859, 860 (2004) (“When discussing indeterminacy in meaning, linguists and philosophers often distinguish between ambiguity and