Serrano-Serra’s actions were tangential, without any culpable knowledge, and bolstered by his redemptive act and do not, therefore, bar him. Furthermore, the persecutor bar should not apply to Serrano-Serra because the accurate interpretation of the persecutor bar includes an exception for duress, requiring those barred to possess personal culpability in their actions.
I. Serrano-Serra neither assisted persecution nor had sufficient knowledge of it occurring because his actions, when viewed as a whole and accounting for his redemptive behavior, were tangential, inconsequential, and lacked any culpability.
The persecutor bar in 8 U.S.C. §1158 (b)(2)(A)(i) bars applicants who “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution …show more content…
Singh v. Gonzales, 417 F. 3d 736, 737 (7th Cir. 2005). In Singh v. Gonzales, Singh worked for a local police force in India where he managed other constables and performed customary police duties such as patrolling, interrogating, investigating, preparing reports, and taking people into custody. Id. The police force systematically arrested, without cause, innocent Sikhs while torturing and sometimes killing the detainees, then falsely claimed that they violently resisted arrest. Id. Singh testified that his consistent role in the countless raids was to act as an armed guard outside the door of the homes. Id. At one time, Singh was even present for the brutal interrogation of his own cousin at the hands of the police chief. Id. In addressing this issue of first instance, the Seventh Circuit determined that simply being a member of that local police force at a pertinent time of persecution was not enough to merit application of the persecutor bar. Id. at 739. However, the court relied heavily on the fact that Singh had freely chosen to associate with such a vicious group of persecutors for over a decade and could have left at any time but chose to stay in order to receive a steady paycheck. Id. at 740. The court held that “pecuniary reasons” for assisting in persecution are irrelevant.
I. Serrano-Serra neither assisted persecution nor had sufficient knowledge of it occurring because his actions, when viewed as a whole and accounting for his redemptive behavior, were tangential, inconsequential, and lacked any culpability.
The persecutor bar in 8 U.S.C. §1158 (b)(2)(A)(i) bars applicants who “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution …show more content…
Singh v. Gonzales, 417 F. 3d 736, 737 (7th Cir. 2005). In Singh v. Gonzales, Singh worked for a local police force in India where he managed other constables and performed customary police duties such as patrolling, interrogating, investigating, preparing reports, and taking people into custody. Id. The police force systematically arrested, without cause, innocent Sikhs while torturing and sometimes killing the detainees, then falsely claimed that they violently resisted arrest. Id. Singh testified that his consistent role in the countless raids was to act as an armed guard outside the door of the homes. Id. At one time, Singh was even present for the brutal interrogation of his own cousin at the hands of the police chief. Id. In addressing this issue of first instance, the Seventh Circuit determined that simply being a member of that local police force at a pertinent time of persecution was not enough to merit application of the persecutor bar. Id. at 739. However, the court relied heavily on the fact that Singh had freely chosen to associate with such a vicious group of persecutors for over a decade and could have left at any time but chose to stay in order to receive a steady paycheck. Id. at 740. The court held that “pecuniary reasons” for assisting in persecution are irrelevant.