In 1899 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council established the exclusivity principle in Union Colliery Company of British Columbia v Bryden. Mr. Bryden was an investor in the coal mining company and was upset by the latter’s policy of employing and advancing “Chinamen” to supervisory …show more content…
It also stated that unless the two levels of government reach an agreement, the provinces have no business interfering in federal issues (BAILII). Hence, the Chinese workers were allowed to continue working in Union Colliery. However, the justices did not at any time consider the dignity and implied rights of the workers. They had none. Nor did they enjoy any “implicit liberties” because they were not Canadians and could never become “real Canadians” (BAILII). Indeed, the matter was resolved on a constitutional technicality drafted by a group of wealthy white males who had little interest in extending rights to …show more content…
Homma argued that unlike the Union Colliery workers he was a naturalized Canadian and should as such enjoy the same rights and protections as British Canadians. In the majority opinion the justices cited that those arguments were trumped by the constitutional mandate given to the provinces (Geiger-Adams 4). Hence, at the stroke of the gavel, Mr. Tomekichi Homma and thousands of disenfranchised Canadians lost their right to vote. In the early 20th century there was virtually no support from the political establishment to expand voting rights to minorities. Xenophobia dominated the minds of many white Canadians coupled with the fear that their economic security would be at peril unless the minorities were kept at bay. On the merits of the Qualification and Registration of Voters Act, British Columbia Premier James Dunsmuir stated that it would protect British Canadian legacy and their way of government (Geiger-Adams 5). There was virtually no political dissent to this establishment