This freedom is compatible with causality that was employed in Smith’s defense. It is undoubtedly true that there were causes for Smith’s actions. We can look at his conditions to explain his choices. However, the crucial point is that Smith did not face a dire financial situation and therefore was not constrained to act only in one particular manner. Instead, despite his situation, he possessed two choices that included not stealing the money from the cashier. The second choice can be explained equally well on the basis of causality that while Smith did desire to steal that money, the fear of losing his job and going to prison made him choose not to do so. The fact that we can explain both the choices could have happened on basis of the circumstances of the case. The reason why one choice happened over the other is not the absence of free will but the practical demonstration of free will, where an agent made a crucial choice and is now being held responsible for his actions. The jury agreed with the prosecutor that Smith’s actions did indeed meet the criteria of being performed under free will. The judge noted that mere causality does not lead to constrained choices as eloquently explained by the prosecutor. As long as causality allows some choices, a person can and should be considered as possessing free will. Smith was pronounced
This freedom is compatible with causality that was employed in Smith’s defense. It is undoubtedly true that there were causes for Smith’s actions. We can look at his conditions to explain his choices. However, the crucial point is that Smith did not face a dire financial situation and therefore was not constrained to act only in one particular manner. Instead, despite his situation, he possessed two choices that included not stealing the money from the cashier. The second choice can be explained equally well on the basis of causality that while Smith did desire to steal that money, the fear of losing his job and going to prison made him choose not to do so. The fact that we can explain both the choices could have happened on basis of the circumstances of the case. The reason why one choice happened over the other is not the absence of free will but the practical demonstration of free will, where an agent made a crucial choice and is now being held responsible for his actions. The jury agreed with the prosecutor that Smith’s actions did indeed meet the criteria of being performed under free will. The judge noted that mere causality does not lead to constrained choices as eloquently explained by the prosecutor. As long as causality allows some choices, a person can and should be considered as possessing free will. Smith was pronounced