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Twospecial factors for imposing a duty of care:
- Strong relationship of control over the Defendant = a duty to control
- Special responsibility towards to Victim = duty to protect
Duty based upon the existence of twospecial relationships of proximity – one as between the defendant and the thirdparty harm-doer and another as between the defendant and the victim.
To be distinguished from vicariousliability:Vicarious liability – a form of no-faultliability. No inquiry made into defendant’s conduct. Liability based entirelyupon defendant’s position or status and consequent relationship with actualtortfeasor. Triggered automatically by latter’s commission of tort. No need toestablish breach or causation.
Woodland liability is separate from these two categories.
Exceptional Duty of Care Scenarios: Third Party Liability - Founding principle - special relationship - no policy reason to allow Crown special immunity - foreseeability
Held: Borstal authorities owed a duty of care to the owners of property near the camp. There were no good reasons of public policy for allowing the Crown any special immunity in this respect. Liability restricted to the property-owners in the immediate vicinity their loss was foreseeable, and would not have extended to others further a field. The Home Office owed a duty of care for their omission as they were in a position of control over the 3rd party who caused the damage and it was foreseeable that harm would result from their inaction. C won.
The case is perhaps relevant not only for its clear elucidation of the Atkinian notion of Neighbourhood but also for its expression of a thoroughly incrementalist approach to the development of the duty of care. Lord Reid held:‘there has been a steady trend toward regarding the law of negligence as depending on principle so that when a new point emerges one should ask not whether it is covered by authority but whether recognised principles apply to it. Donoghue and Stevenson may be regarded as a milestone, and the well-known passage in Lord Atkin’s piece should I think be regarded as a statement of principle … it ought to apply unless there is some justification or valid explanation for its exclusion. For example, causing economic loss is a different matter’
Authority for theexistence of a duty to control the actions of a third party in order to preventharm being caused to a particular class of victims, in situations in which itcan be shown:
(i) that there is a very strong relationship of authority andcontrol between the ‘responsible’ defendant and the ‘irresponsible’ third partyperpetrator;
(ii) that the claimant comes within a narrowly defined class ofpotential victims; and
(iii) that the harm-causing conduct of the third partywas at least something that was very likely to occur in the circumstances.
Third Party Liability - special relationship - Relationshipbetween prison authorities and inmates giving rise to obligation on part ofprison authorities to prevent inmates from harming each other
Held, on appeal, (1) the injury caused to the plaintiff did not result from the breach of the prison rule; (2) the duty on those responsible for prisons was to take reasonable care for the safety of those who were within, and that included those who were within against their wish or will, of whom the plaintiff was one; in the circumstances of this case, the prison authorities could not reasonably have foreseen that an attack might be made on the plaintiff by the mental defective, and consequently, the claim for damages for common law negligence failed
Third Party Liability - special relationship - Relationship between prison authorities and inmates giving rise to obligation on part of prison authorities to prevent inmates from harming each other
Third Party Liability - special relationship - Relationship between prison authorities and inmates giving rise to obligation on part of prison authorities to prevent inmates self-harming in those with known such tendencies
Held: The police had assumed the responsibility of passing information to the prison authorities when they arrested him, the husband had relied on that assumption of responsibility, there was a duty of care and it was breached. Since his act was the very occurrence which should have been prevented, the defence of volenti non fit injuria could not succeed.Since suicide was no longer criminal act the defence of ex turpi causa non oritur actio was not available. C won
Held: Although persons of sound mind were generally taken to be responsible for their own actions, in rare situations a duty could be owed to such persons to prevent them from self harm. That had occurred in the instant case. The duty represented an exception to the rule that a deliberate act by a person of sound mind taking advantage of the defendant's negligent act would destroy the causative link. A deliberate act of suicide was not a novus actus interveniens, if it were the very act which the duty sought to prevent would break the chain of causation. L was held contributorily negligent and damages were reduced by 50 per cent to apportion fault equally. C won reduced damages
[Comment] 100 percent contributory negligence is rare and arguably illogical; only a contribution between 1 - 99 percent is possible on strict reading of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 see also Pitts v Hunt [1990]
Held: The police were under a duty to take reasonable steps to identify whether or not a prisoner presented a suicide risk. The obligation to take reasonable care to prevent a prisoner from taking his own life only arose where the police knew or ought to have known that the individual prisoner presented a suicide risk, Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] applied. The deceased was not a person whom the officers knew or ought to have known was a suicide risk. C lost
duty of care - mental patients - no liability for murder of a child - lack of proximity - act of third party - just fair and reasonable
Held: There was no proximity between D the child and C. In Barrett C had been in the care of D and no issue of proximity had been raised, and so was distinguished. Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] and Marc Rich and Co AG v Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd [1996] did not take account of third party intervention. The court asked how the offences could have been avoided even if sufficient proximity were established. C lost
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