For instance, the amount to which a victim must actively resist their attacker has been hotly debated throughout our country’s history. At first, victims had to prove that they had done their “utmost” to resist, and sexual assault could only be counted as rape if physical force was involved; threats did not count (Levit and Verchick, 3876-3911). Furthermore, even though statutes have been changed to relax the law and make only “reasonable” resistance the required evidence that victims fought against their rapists, some states refuse to accept simple verbal rebukes as reasonable resistance, unnecessarily complicating cases (Levit and Verchick, 3911). Another problem comes in the form of the specific wording of some states’ rape laws. For example, California’s rape laws describe rape as “an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator” (Westlaw), which makes marital rape an offense you cannot prosecute in California. Rape law also “[assumes] that women lie about their nonconsent to sexual activity for various reasons” (Levit and Verchick, 3911), thus giving the accused much more power than the accuser. This considerable power imbalance further complicates an already-sensitive area of law, and stands in stark contrast to other standing laws, like sexual harassment-related holdings, which instead favor the accusers over the accused (Berk lecture, 10/24). Why have these contradictory methodologies? Why place undue suspicion on people who are most likely hurting and
For instance, the amount to which a victim must actively resist their attacker has been hotly debated throughout our country’s history. At first, victims had to prove that they had done their “utmost” to resist, and sexual assault could only be counted as rape if physical force was involved; threats did not count (Levit and Verchick, 3876-3911). Furthermore, even though statutes have been changed to relax the law and make only “reasonable” resistance the required evidence that victims fought against their rapists, some states refuse to accept simple verbal rebukes as reasonable resistance, unnecessarily complicating cases (Levit and Verchick, 3911). Another problem comes in the form of the specific wording of some states’ rape laws. For example, California’s rape laws describe rape as “an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator” (Westlaw), which makes marital rape an offense you cannot prosecute in California. Rape law also “[assumes] that women lie about their nonconsent to sexual activity for various reasons” (Levit and Verchick, 3911), thus giving the accused much more power than the accuser. This considerable power imbalance further complicates an already-sensitive area of law, and stands in stark contrast to other standing laws, like sexual harassment-related holdings, which instead favor the accusers over the accused (Berk lecture, 10/24). Why have these contradictory methodologies? Why place undue suspicion on people who are most likely hurting and