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115 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
Involves two main issues: Is a human made of only one component? If the answer is two components, do mind and matter interact, and if so, how does that interaction take place?
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Mind-Body Problem
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Claims that a human being is completely physical
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Physicalism
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Claims that a human being is both physical and mental
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Dualism
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The view that the only substances that exist are material substances but some of these substances may possess a duality of material and immaterial properties and immaterial abstract objects may also exist.
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Materialism
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A completely developed physics and chemistry could give a complete, unified description and explanation of all phenomena because the world is one physical system
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Unity of science
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The properties that are possessed only by physical objects
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Physical properties
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Something such that it would not exist if there were no sentient creatures. Or something about which the subject is in a better position to know than is anyone else, or something to which a subject has private, first-person access. They belong to the private world of inner experience.
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Mental entity
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Individual events that occur at particular times such as experiences of colors, sounds, smells, tastes, textures, pains, itches.
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Sensations
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Having a certain mental attitude toward a state of affairs by means of a proposition that can be expressed by a that-clause
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Propositional attitudes
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Intentional actions are episodes of volition by conscious selves wherein and whereby they do various actions. They are acts of the will.
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Purposings
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There are some physical substances that have only physical properties.
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Property dualism
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The brain is a physical object that has physical properties and the mind or soul is a mental substance that has mental properties.
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Substance dualism
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Properties that present themselves directly to the subject, they are psychological attributes, they are directly present to a subject because that subject simply has them immediately in his field of consciousness.
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Self-Presenting properties
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Knowing one's own mental life in a way not available to anyone else
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Private access
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A subject is incapable of being mistaken about that thing
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Incorrigible
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The simple fact of consciousness, constituted by the subjective feel or texture of experience itself.
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Knowledge argument
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Qualities such as colors, tastes, sounds, smells, and textures
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Secondary qualities
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Qualities thought to be among the properties that characterize matter--weight, shape, size, solidity, motion.
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Primary qualities
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The mind's "ofness" or "aboutness." The intrinsic, nondispositional, irreducible, feature of those states.
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Intentionality
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The vantage point that one uses to describe the world from one's own point of view.
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First-person perspective
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Words like I, here, now, there, and then.
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Indexicals
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Physicalism says that everything can be exhaustively described in an object language from ___________.
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Third-person perspective
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One's body constantly gains new parts and loses old one, and even though one's mental states come and go in rapid succession, nevertheless, the person himself remains the same because he is a mental self that is other than his body parts and mental states.
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Personal identity
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Free will
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Libertarian freedom
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When matter reaches a certain organizational complexity and structure, then matter "produces" mental states like fire produces smoke, or the structure of hydrogen and oxygen in water "produces" wetness.
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Epiphenomenalism
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One state or event causes another event to occur. It involves a state of one thing existing as an efficient cause that is prior to an effect, which is the production of a state in another thing.
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Event-event causation
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Substances are the cause
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Agent causation
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People should not multiply entities beyond what is needed to explain something
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Ockham's razor
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It is possible to provide general, reductive, nonmentalistic necessary and sufficient conditions for any mental type of state.
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Reductive physicalism
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Does not believe that such a general set of necessary and sufficient conditions exist or are necessary in order to provide physicalist treatments of mental entities.
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Nonreductive physicalism
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The view that in doing psychology from an empirical standpoint, one should describe, report and explain mental states in terms of publicly observable behaviors and not in terms of private, first-person, inner conscious states.
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Methodological behaviorism
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Mental states are identified with overt bodily behaviors or tendencies to certain behaviors, given certain stimulus inputs.
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Philosophical behaviorism
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Definitions of something solely in terms of what can be empirically tested or measured by certain tests or operations
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Operational definitions
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A general kind of thing that can be in more than one place at the same time or at the same place at different interrupted times.
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Type
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An individual, particular instance of a type.
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Token
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Types of mental states are identical to types of physical stuff or "hardware" in the brain and central nervous system
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Hardware view
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An object with different hardware states that is able to experience the same mental state as a human.
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Multiple realization
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There is no set of general conditions that can be given for identifying a general kind of mental state with a general kind of brain state.
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Token-token identity theory
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Mental states are functional states of organisms
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Functionalism
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The mind is fundamentally a computer program
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Strong artificial intelligence
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Making reference to the different inputs, outputs, and other features of the program that the computer uses to operate
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Software view
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Qualia is plural for quale, which means a specific experiential quality.
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Inverted qualia
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If unconscious machines like computers or robots are able to imitate consciousness by embodying the right functional state, then they are, in fact, in that mental state.
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Absent qualia
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Illustration from John Searle about a man locked in a room with baskets full of Chinese symbols
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Chinese room
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An inadequate theory
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Folk psychology
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If dualism is true and the mind and body are different, then why would we expect that there would be just one mind attached to one body?
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The problem of many minds
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If dualism is true, we can never know that other people have mental states because those states are private mental entities to which we have no direct access.
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Problem of other minds
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The social/political notion of freedom involved in discussions of rights, the authority of the state, and law
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Freedom of permission
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The ability of fully developed, ideally functioning persons to act as unified selves in a responsible, mature way
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Freedom of personal integrity
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That freedom that is part of human action and agency, in which the human being acts as an agent who is in some sense the originator of one's own actions and is in control of one's action.
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Freedom of moral and rational responsibility
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The view that for every event that happens, there are conditions such that, given them, nothing else could have happened.
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Determinism
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Denies the existence of free will
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Hard determinism
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Also called compatibilism, holds that freedom and determinism are compatible with each other and thus the truth of determinism does not eliminate freedom.
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Soft determinism
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If determinism is true, then every human action is causally necessitated by events that obtained prior to the action, including events that existed before the person acting was born.
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Compatibilism
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Human events are parts of causal chains of events that lead up to them in a deterministic fashion
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Happenings
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Free choice is inconceivable or impossible without determinism; a free choice is one that must be determined.
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Hard compatibilists
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It is possible though not likely that libertarianism is true, and thus free choice does not require determinism.
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Soft compatibilists
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Primarily apply the notion of freedom to bodily action.
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Classical compatibilists
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The problem with classical compatibilism is that freedom to act bodily seems to be neither necessary nor sufficient for having the type of freedom necessary to be a responsible agent.
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Contemporary or hierarchical compatibilism
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The freedom necessary for responsible action is not compatible with determinism. Real freedom requires a type of control over one's action.
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Libertarianism.
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Will to do one alternative
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Causal powers
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No event or efficient cause causes a person to act
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First or unmoved mover
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In order to have the freedom necessary for responsible agency, one must have the ability to choose or act differently from the way the agent actually does.
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Ability condition
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The agent would have done otherwise had some other condition obtained.
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Hypothetical ability
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To will to act
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Categorical ability
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If one has the ability to exert his power to do A, one also has the ability to refrain from exerting his power to do A.
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Dual ability
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Being in control of the act itself
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Control condition
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EX: the ability to speak English but not Russian
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First-order power
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EX: Developing the ability to speak Russian
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Second-order power
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All things being the same up to the act itself
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One-way ability
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A lower order desire involving specific state or events
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First-order desire
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The freedom to do what one wants, to act on one's first-order desires.
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Free action
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The act must be what one wills on the matter
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Second-order desire
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One's set of considered value judgments about what is the right, most reasonable thing to do in a given situation.
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Valuational system
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An act is free if and only if it is under the agent's own control, and it is under his own control if and only if the act was appropriately caused by the right mental states existing in the agent prior to the act.
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Causal theory of action
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Cases where the appropriate mental states do in fact cause an event to take place but in an accidental way such that the event does not count as a real action.
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Causal deviance
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If there are movers and things moved following an order to infinity.
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Intermediate movers
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Requires that an agent have a personal reason for acting before the act counts as a free one.
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Rationality condition
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That by means of which an effect is produced.
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Efficient cause
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That for the sake of which an effect is produced.
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Final cause
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A desire and a belief that doing something will satisfy the desire
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belief/desire set
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Considering various reasons for and against certain actions.
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Deliberation
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The view that one is free to choose what one will believe.
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Doxastic voluntarism
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The idea that at any moment one can directly choose to believe or not to believe a given item.
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Direct doxastic voluntarism
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The idea that one's beliefs result from processes of deliberation in which one exercises freedom at various points along the way, in what one will or will not consider, how one will look at the issue.
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Indirect doxastic voluntarism
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Weakness of will
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Akrasia
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A relation between two things, namely cause and effect
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Causation
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In free acts, persons cause acts for the sake of reasons
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Agent causation
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A person's acts are simply uncaused events that they spontaneously do by exercising their powers for the sake of reason.
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Noncausal theory of agency
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Certain quantum events are completely uncaused events and are indeterminate, random happenings.
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Quantum physics
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The view that everything that happens does so necessarily and we cannot do anything other than what we shall do.
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Fatalism
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Only what actually happens is possible
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Actualism
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What a person actually does do coincides with what a person possibly could do
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Global fatalism
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The view that there are genuine, isolated instances in our lives where our outcome is fated irrespective of our deliberations or choices.
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Local fatalism
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The view that God's determination of each person's eternal destiny is logically prior to his decree to create mankind and permit the Fall
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Supralapsarianism
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The view that God's determination is logically subsequent to his decrees to create and permit the Fall
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Infralapsarianism
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Future free acts of God's creatures
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Future contingent events
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God's knowledge of what every free creature he could create would do in every possible circumstance in which they could be placed.
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Middle knowledge
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God alone possesses immortality in himself. Still, though human beings are properly and normally to be construed as a unity of material human bodies and immaterial substantial souls, at the time of death a person enters into a temporary disembodied state that is less than complete and then receives a new resurrected body at the general resurrection.
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Traditional position on immortality
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When one dies, they are given some sort of temporal body while waiting for a final resurrected body, or their pre-death body is taken away by God at death and replaced with a corpse that is buried.
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Immediate resurrection position on immortality
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When one dies they become extinct but at the resurrection of the dead God recreates that person all over again out of nothing
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Re-creation position on immortality
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If an entity "x" at time "t" maintains absolute, strict identity with entity "y" at time "t2" then "x" and "y" stand in the identity relation to each other such that Leibniz's law of the indiscernibility of identicals holds for "x" and "y".
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Absolute, strict sense of identity
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Means that the parts of a thing are essential to it as a whole
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Mereological essentialism
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Some objects become a series of spa tiotemporal parts
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Space-time worms
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When one thing is in a weaker relation than identity.
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Genidentity
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Persons differ from physical artifacts in that persons maintain strict, absolute sameness through change.
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Absolute view of personal identity
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Despite having several different but simultaneous experiences one is united as the same person.
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Unity at a given time
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Over the years your body parts come and go, as do your mental states, but they are all aspects of the same person.
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Unity through time
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The body view and the memory view
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Empiricist views of personal identity
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The connection between various person stages that unites them as stages of the "same" person is that all the mental states of the person are connected to the "same" body.
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Body view of empiricism
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It is continuity of psychological characteristics that constitutes personal identity.
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Memory view of empiricism
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The vantage point one uses to describe the world from one's own point of view
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First-person perspective
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The point of view of an observer
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Third-person perspective
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I, Here, There, Now, Then
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Indexicals
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Words that systematically change their referents in a context-dependent way.
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Token reflexive
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