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55 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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• Classical realism
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• Classical realism is mostly normative in approach, and explains the world as a stage for conflicts of power and domination. Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes can all be classified as realists in this sense.
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• Morgenthau’s realism
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• Morgenthau’s realism. A pessimistic view of human nature – essentially self interested and self centred. The Weberian expansion of politics as conflict into the international arena. The fact that politics is essentially conflictual means that it is naïve to project liberal expectations onto statesmanship. Moreover, it is irresponsible and dangerous. The projection of liberal ideals misrepresents that states are essentially self interested, and thus a state that seeks to realise these ideas might have to pay a heavy price.
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tragic dimension of politics
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• Morgenthau says that what must be done is facing the world with knowledge of the tragic dimension of politics: hard choices have to be made, moral transgressions are unavailable. This does not mean anything goes: moderation, prudence and courage must be maintained.
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private and political morality (• Morgenthau )
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• The separation of private and political morality. The individual might say ‘let justice be done even if the world shall perish’, but the state has no right to say so in the name of those under its care. Therefore, we have a very statist approach to political responsibility: the state seeks its interest, because it is responsible to and for its citizens.
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• Liberalism believes ... (morgenthau)
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• Liberalism believes that a rational and moral political order derived from universally valid abstract principles can be achieved here and now. It assumes the essential goodness and infinite malleability of human nature and blames the failure of the social order to measure up to the rational standards on lack of knowledge and understanding, obsolete social institutions, or the depravity of certain particular individuals. It trusts in education, reform and the sporadic use of force to remedy these defects.
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• Realism believes (morgenthau)
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• Realism believes in an imperfect world, which is so inherent from forces in human nature ( M has often been dubbed a ‘biological realist’.) To improve the world, one must work with these forces, not against them. This being a world of opposing interests and of conflict among them, moral principles can never be fully realised, but are at best temporarily approximated through the ever temporary balancing of interests and the ever precarious settlement of conflicts. This school then sees in a system of checks and balances a universal system for all pluralist societies. It appeals to historical precedent rather than abstract universal principles, and points to a realization of lesser evil rather than of the absolute good.
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Morgenthau's error
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He is trying to say to things: a. that the world is how the realist describes it: full of self interested individuals in a state of anarchy and so on. It this sense, he is promoting an interpretative model, which seeks to explain international reality, through an objective and rational framework. Since it seeks to make generalisations, like all models, it is essentially abstract. Not only does it suffer from its abstraction, but it seems aware that it does suffer indeed. M seeks to define states as self interested, politics as its own sphere characterised by conflict and the search for power and domination etc. This is the descriptive stage. But then M moves on to a prescriptive stage: it which he asks the states to face up to the realist nature of international politics and stop trying to reduce political problems to problems of morality and legality. But by the very fact that political agents do partly seek criteria of legality and morality in their action, but the very fact that many states do want to realise such concerns in their foreign policy it should be clear that the descriptive part of the realist model is too reductionist, too simple to understand and capture fully the nature of international relations. M does in part acknowledge that states are moved by other concerns than power, but only when he is prescribing that the should face up to the realist nature of politics. When he tries to empirically ground that realist conception of reality, he sudden ly forgets what motivated his prescriptivism.
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How did Morgenthau make his fundamental error?
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• Power. M sees human beings, and by extension states, as necessarily seeking to preserve or increase their power. The struggle for power is something that he conceived as essential in human nature. Why? He conflates the means to an end with the end. He accepts that human beings (and states) have various goals: some self regarding and egoistic, some other regarding and idealistic. But whatever they perceive these interests to be, M claims that they seeks as an immediate aim, power. It is sought as a means, but insofar as it is necessary as a means, it is also sought as an end in itself (either because it shall serve as a means eventually, or because it has become idealised as a final end in it self.)
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Power (Morgenthau)
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Power as the control of men over the mind and actions of other men.
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Political power
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Political power refers to the mutual relations of control among the holder of public authority and between the latter and the people at large. A has political power over B if she has the ability to control certain actions of B through influencing B’s mind. (Note: then this means that the political power is separate from military power. In this sense, when A takes over B, he does not have political power over B. But what about the case when A drops bombs on B for the purpose of changing B’s mind? If B does change his mind, is that no political power under our definition? But this does not matter: both military and political, whatever there boundaries are, are powers)
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soft power (Nye)
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• The power of charisma, or what Nye would call soft power, is under this definition, not ruled out as power.
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3 aims of policy according to realism
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• All policy is either in the name of keeping power, increasing power, or demonstrating power.
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true political purpose according to realism
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• The struggle for power is the true political purpose. Of course, it is not the sole purpose that political actors see themselves acting under. Moral considerations, or the need to keep within legal restraints, is often what motivates policy and not the pursuit of power. But M has soughed to establish that the search to promote whatever end, is in effect a search for power.
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Morality, (realism)
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Morality is what the weak push forward to limit the exercise of power by the strong.
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ideology (realism)
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Ideology is a vehicle of the promotion of either the status quo (and advocated by those that want to keep their share of power) or is a vehicle of the promotion of a reaction to the status quo (advocated by those that want to increase their power).
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• International Law and Government (realism)
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• International Law and Government have failed to provide substantive solutions to the problem of peace.
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international order (realism)
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• The international order necessarily as a system of balance of power; the attainment of this balance is precarious, unpredictable, and temporary. The struggle towards the attainment of such a balance is universal.
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Realism's Attempt to influence policy? (Keohane's quote)
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From Keohane p.9: ‘the self styled realists sought to reorient US foreign policy so that American policymakers could cope with Soviet attempts at domination without either lapsing into passive unwillingness to use force or engaging in destructive and quitoxic crusades ‘to make the world safe for democracy’. Their ideas were greeted warmly by the policymakers, who sought, in Hoffman’s words “to exorcise isolationism, justify a permanent and global involvement in world affairs, and rationalise the accumulation of power’”.
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Neorealism famous book
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Theories of International Relations (1979) Waltz
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Laws--Waltz
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Law is an observed regularity between two variables
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theory --Waltz
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A theory on the other hand, should not aim to describe reality, but to explain it
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what is the key difference between a theory and a law (from neorealism and its critics) accoridng to Waltz
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• Chapter two: Laws and Theories Law is an observed regularity between two variables. A theory on the other hand, should not aim to describe reality, but to explain it. In other words, theory should not be based on empirical data, whose pool it tries to increase as much as possible. On the other hand, theory must be the project of creation, an abstraction that generates an explanatory model: creates hypotheses about regularities between phenomena, and manages to make predictions. It is clear that Waltz borrows a lot from theories of positivist economics.
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what is the reductionist approach to IR for Waltz
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A reductionist theory is a theory about the behaviour of parts. This reductionism W sees shared between ‘traditionalist’ theories that seek in history the elements of analysing international relations and spotting patterns – and the modern approach which places emphasis on scientific models. The study of interacting units is thought to exhaust the subject, to include all that can be included both at the level of the unit and at the level of the system.
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Whats the problem with the reductionist approach for Waltz?
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• The problem with the reductionist approach: It fails to explain the persistent patterns in international relations, despite the differences in the variables that determine the interactions between units. The point being, that classical realists take the characteristics of states to determine both outcomes and patterns of interaction. The point that W is making is that although there are differences in the dispositions of states, the patterns of interaction and the outcomes on the international scene are not always traceable back to those dispositions.
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What is the best model according to Waltz? why
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• Systemic models as holding better explanatory force. What do we mean by explaining?: I mean explain in these senses: ‘to say why the range of expected outcomes falls within certain limits; to ay why patterns of behaviour recur; to say why events repeat themselves, including events that none of few of the actors may like’ . p.57
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• What do structures create according to Waltz
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• How do structures work? Structures create the framework within the individual actors make choices. The existence of the structure is not reduced to the sum of its parts – we cannot understand the structure of the international system merely by considering what choices state – actors make. But we need to understand this structure first before we can understand and interpret the behaviour of agents within it: much like the need for a theory of the market in order to understand the behaviour of firms.
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What are the two ways structures work according to Waltz
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The first way in which structures work their effects in through a process of socialization that limits and moulds behaviour. The second way is through competition.’ p.65
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first barrier to cooperation according to walt?
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• The anarchic structure of the world means that states feel formostly insecure. The first thing that the want to ensure is their survival. There lies the first barrier of cooperation: states are worried that if other states gain more power than they do, they will use that power against them. Therefore, it is relative gain that matters, which goes against the mutual gain favoured by cooperation.
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what type of gain matters according to waltz
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• The anarchic structure of the world means that states feel formostly insecure. The first thing that the want to ensure is their survival. There lies the first barrier of cooperation: states are worried that if other states gain more power than they do, they will use that power against them. Therefore, it is relative gain that matters, which goes against the mutual gain favoured by cooperation.
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what does Waltz say about • Interdependence and Integration
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States might be interdependent, but they are not very integrated. Interdependence implies a loose organisation, integration implies centralisation.
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effect of the prisoner’s dilemma in international relations (Waltz)
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• Sometimes the effect of actions might have a result that noone wants. The effect of the prisoner’s dilemma in international relations, and other games where the dominant strategy is one that results in net losses for all. In anticipation of want others might do, the unwanted outcome becomes a self fulfilling prophecy.
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Where do Waltz and Morgenthau differ in their accounts of state power?
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• The point here unlike Morgenthau’s is that state are not necessarily out of nature in search of more power, but do so as a response to a system which allows them few other choice, if they want to ensure their survival. In this sense, they have to help themselves. • The point here is that states do not necessarily only want power: they might have plenty of other goals to realise. But they are tied by structural constraints.
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What does Waltz mean by structural change and why is it important in his theory?
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• The only remedy for a strong structural effect is structural change. Structural change is a change of the distribution of capabilities. Structures change also by imposing requirements on what it is demanded of them.
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How are political structures defined by Waltz?
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Political structures are defined by their ordering principle, differentiation of function and distribution of capabilities.
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What are the two political ordering principles according to Waltz?
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• The international stage as anarchical. Political structures are defined by their ordering principle, differentiation of function and distribution of capabilities. Anarchy and hierarchy are two principal political ordering principles. Hierarchy implies differentiation of functions. Functions in the domestic political sphere are differentiated, but anarchic orders have little functional differentiation. National politics consists of differentiated units performing specified functions. International politics consists of like units duplicating each others activities.’
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structural realism and realpolitik
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• The affinity between structural realism and realpolitik. The difference between the two lies in that the former sees in persistent structural constraints the reason why the international outcome takes similar forms across times.
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• The core of realpolitik (4 principles)
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1 The state’s interest provides the spring of action;2 the necessities of policy arise from the unregulated competition of states; 3 calculation based on these necessities can discover the policies that will best serve a state’s interest; 4 success is the ultimate test of policy and success is defined as preserving and strengthening the state.
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• Balance of power theory
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• Balance of power theory: Begins with assumptions about states. They are actors who at a minimum seek their own preservation and at a maximum drive for universal domination. The means that they have in the face of these ends are both internal and external., (self – explanatory). The expected outcome is the formation of balances of power.
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Waltz difference with Morgenthau on the understanding of the balance of power
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W sees BoP as the necessary outcome given a structure of anarchy, where functions are undifferentiated. M on the other had, gives a normative character to the BoP argument.
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Morgenthau on Balance of power
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• M: “the balance of power can impose its restraints upon the power aspirations of nations only if they first restrain themselves by accepting the system of the balance of power as the common framework of their endeavours”. Only if states recognise the rules of the game and play for the same limited stakes can the balance of power fulfil its functions for international stability and national independence.
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Waltz on balance of power
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• W agrees with my intuition that we cannot we cannot use the content of the descriptive to provide prescriptions as to how the states must behave. Against M W uses “an ordeliness abstracted from behaviour cannot guide behaviour”. Analogy with markets: like saying that the best way to ensure that we have a perfectly competitive Market is by ensuring that all firms minimize profit. Obviously, this is rather absurd.
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Criticism of Waltz and his response /w Balance of power theory
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a) Balance of power theory makes assumptions about what states pursue which are simply not true. States do not pursue to balance, nor do they pursue to maximise their power in relations to other states. In response, Waltz claims that his theory never meant to claim that states pursue balance in the first place. As for the objection that states do not necessarily seek actively to assure their survival, or domination of others, Waltz also acknowledges that there are many factors that determine what motivates the behaviour of the state. But all these are purposeful assumptions in this theory, that are not meant to be tested as true or false. But then what are the conclusions of the theory? How can it be tested? What counts as a falsification of the theory?
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explanatory power of neorealism according to waltz
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• Before we can consider those points, lets summarize what Waltz says about the explanatory power of neorealism. It does not purport to explain how a particular state will react. Rather, balance of power theory can give general and useful answers to the question, what will the state have to react to? The theory explains why a certain similarity of behaviour is to be expected from similarly situated states. It is not a theory of foreign policy, but a theory of international relations.
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how should Waltz's theory be tested (according to Waltz)
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It is not a theory of foreign policy, but a theory of international relations.
• Think about how this means that Waltz’s theory is meant to be tested. It is not a theory that describes everything that happens in IR, but a model of abstraction that is conscious of its differences with reality. Think of the parallel with economic theory: it too abstracts from economic reality, and seeks to explain it, by seeking to determine how far the hypotheses of the theory match the truth, and if not, what ignored variables are responsible. |
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• What are the hypotheses and tests that Waltz’s theory comes up with? (for structural theory)
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• What are the hypotheses and tests that Waltz’s theory comes up with? ‘Structural theories gain plausibility if similarities of behaviour are observed across realms that are different in substance but similar in structure, and if differences of behaviour are observed where realms are similar in substance but different in structure’ .
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• According to structural realism theory, states tend to...
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• According to the theory, states tend to balance power and copy behaviour of successful states. Within a given arena and over a number of years, we should find the military power of weaker and smaller states growing more rapidly (or shrinking more slowly) than that of stronger and larger ones. And we should find widespread imitation among competing states.’ p.124 States become ‘socialised’ to the system.
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Structural realism predicts that states will engage in...
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• One predicts that states will engage in balancing behaviour, whether or not balanced power is the end of their acts. This means that weaker states will not normally join the alliance of the stronger state, but will seek the opposing alliance, under which they can feel safer and more appreciated.
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What is the principle aim of politics for Morgenthau vs. Waltz?
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• Power and survival. A big difference with Morgenthau . Whereas M maintained that states necessarily seek power, W says that what they predominately seek is survival – because such survival is no guarantee in a system of anarchy, since there is always the possibility that another state will use force. It is contingent whether they will seek to maximise power in the effort to survive. ‘The goal the system encourages them to seek is security. Increased power may or may not serve that role… States can seldom afford to make maximised power their goal. International politics is too serious a business for that’.
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What does Waltz's model attempt to do, and with what?
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a. It is an abstract model, and as such it aims to explain, and not to describe. It deals with a bounded domain, and with limited variables, consciously leaving many other contingents out of the question. Like economics, it abstracts from real situations, and creates ideals which aim to create hypotheses as to what is the expected behaviour in a certain set of circumstances.
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How does Waltz model differ from classical realism?
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How it differs from classical realism. The search for power is not a fact of nature, but the result of structural constraints. Less descriptive but more explanatory power. Survival and security as the end, power as the means.
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A general criticism of Waltz's structuralist model is that...
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Too limited a model to generate any helpful predications. International state not a state of anarchy simpliciter, but also a state governed by norms, rules, shared understandings and ideologies, expectations, etc, all this informed by international law, the role of international organisations, and how we perceive each other. W says that the structure pulls towards balance of power, whatever the centrifugal tendencies of these external variables might be. An examination of pose Cold War theory will point out that there is little tendency towards a balance of power. E.g. no coalitions against the US on a grand scale. Most smaller states tend to side with the US rather than against it.
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Waltz and Balance of Threat
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We can take deny that even if we live in an anarchic world, the perception of power is what motivates states to seek security. States might not feel the paramount need to look for security even in an anarchic world. It is not power, but other considerations that seek to inform how states act vis a vis other states. For example, the US does not see many other forces as adversaries, perhaps because of a shared understanding that they do not pose a threat to its security. (perceived as liberal, pacifist etc). But when we start talking about balance of threat, and not balance of power (as Walt does), then we have moved beyond the neorealist argument, and have entered the realm of liberalism, or even constructivism. Since perceptions are dependent on the constitution, attitude and disposition of both the ‘and the perceiver and the perceived , threat is not something that is determinable from a view that seeks to explain actions and outcome from structural constraints alone.
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Vasquez' critique of Waltz' balance of threat
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• Walt and balance of threat says that states seek to balance not only capabilities but predominately threat, which is a combination of capability and intention. Vasquez argues that balance of threat is theoretically degenerative, and ad hoc addition to the theory inconsistent with its basic propositions but necessary to ‘rescue’ it from the theoretical failures inherent in those very premises.
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why might hegemony pose a probelm for structural realism?
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Even if we look for the need to look for security in an anarchic world, this does not mean that there shall be a structural tendency towards equilibrium in the form of the balance of power. How does structural realism explain hegemony?
5. Bipolarity seems the most natural outcome of neorealist assumptions. But as Donelly notes, there have only been four cases of bipolarity in the whole of history. |
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realism and changes in structure (criticism)
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How does neorealism explain changes in structure? One could claim that realism is prejudiced against cooperation, in that it sees it as useless in a situation where all that matters is relative gain (cooperation in the form of alliances against others is of course well understood and integrated in neorealist thought). But this precludes a change towards more institutionalism, which plausibly we have seen happening since the end of the Cold War.
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